Theological Origins of Modernity

luther and the storm of faith 119
be a believer, he must also be able to understand the language of the text.
Th is means an attentiveness to linguistic usage (that Luther derives from
nominalism) and the use of humanistic training and scholarship to come
to terms with the meaning of the text in its original Hebrew and Greek. 77
One might thus describe Luther’s method of interpreting Scripture as a
combination of nominalism, humanism, and faith. Th e hermeneutic principle
involves being grasped by the biblical word and the spirit conjoined
in such a way that one is laid hold of by more than what the text says.
“It is being grasped in one’s depth, being redirected in one’s total being,
including heart and mind by the living Word.” 78 Th e touchstone of textual
authenticity, according to Luther, is whether the preacher emphasizes
Christ or not. Within his theology, the cross of Christ is thus the standard
of exegesis, for only through the cross is God’s word truly revealed: “Crux
Christi unica est eruditio verborum dei, theologia sincerissima.” 79
Luther promotes a more literal reading of Scripture in contrast to the
tradition of scholastic interpretation within the church. In this respect he
was greatly infl uenced by Valla and Erasmus and by his own recognition
that so-called consensus of the Catholic tradition was a fi ction. But it would
be a mistake to believe that his reading of the Scriptures is strictly literal.
He clearly privileges the texts of John and Paul over those of Matthew,
Mark and Luke, and his reading and preaching thus owe more to Paul and
Augustine than to the Jesus of the Gospels. 80
luther’s new view of human being
Luther’s radical transformation of theology had a decisive impact on his
view of man. In nominalistic fashion, Luther sees humans not as a species
but as individuals who are “distinguished from the animals by speech and
not by shape or form or any other activity.” 81 In this respect and to this
extent, he remains within the Aristotelian tradition. However, he quickly
diverges from this Aristotelian beginning, for he identifi es speech not with
reason but with a capacity to apprehend the word. Reason in the traditional
sense is in fact merely a manifestation of a false human pride that
arises out of a fallacious belief in human power. Humans by nature are not
free and powerful, as earlier humanists such as Pico, for example, imagined
them to be, but the slaves of Satan without any real power of choice or
decision. Only through the word, through God’s gracious infusion of faith,
can they escape their bondage to the devil. Th is escape, however, does not
lead them to freedom but into subjection to God.
While human beings for the most part are enslaved to Satan, they are