Theological Origins of Modernity

the contradictions of enlightenment 261
If the antinomy cannot be resolved, then it is diffi cult to see how the
modern scientifi c and technological project that seeks to make man the
master and possessor of nature can be compatible with a moral and political
project that aims to realize and secure human freedom. As Kant
and his successors realized, this is thus the question on which the fate of
modernity turns. Th e antinomy, however, did not spring full-grown from
the head of Kant. Th e antinomy is decisive for modernity precisely because
it brings into the open the contradictions that were hidden in the
modern project from the very beginning, and from before the beginning.
Th e antinomies, and the decisive third antinomy in particular, are deeply
rooted in early modern and premodern thought. Indeed, as we will see,
the problem that appears in the third antinomy and that has had such an
important impact on later thought appeared fi rst in the debate between
Erasmus and Luther, and then more explicitly in the debate between
Descartes and Hobbes in the “Objections and Replies” to the Meditations.
We have already examined the earlier debate in detail. In this chapter we
will examine the latter.
As we have seen, modernity in the broadest sense was a series of attempts
to answer the fundamental questions that arose out of the nominalist revolution.
Th ese questions were both profound and comprehensive, putting
into doubt not merely the knowledge of God, man, and nature, but reason
and being as well. Th e humanist movement and the Reformation were
comprehensive attempts to answer these questions. Th ey both accepted the
nominalist ontology of radical individualism, but they disagreed ontically
about which of the traditional realms of being was foundational. Th e humanists
began their account with man and interpreted the other realms
of being anthropomorphically. Th e Reformers, by contrast, believed that
God was primary and interpreted man and nature theologically. As we
have seen, however, neither the humanists nor the Reformers were willing
to eliminate either God or man. Th e humanists did not suggest that God
did not exist, and the Reformers did not deny the independence of human
beings. However, such qualifi cations, especially in times of persecution,
are oft en merely camoufl age for deeper claims. To the extent that their differences
were foundational, each position denied the ground of the other,
as we saw in our examination of the debate between Erasmus and Luther.
If one begins as Erasmus does with man and asserts even a minimal effi
cacy for human freedom, divine omnipotence is compromised and the
reality of the Christian God is called into question. Morality in this way
renders piety superfl uous. If one begins with a doctrine of divine freedom
and omnipotence manifested as divine grace, no human freedom is possible.
Religion crushes morality and transforms human beings into mere