Theological Origins of Modernity

246 chapter seven
religious view of good and evil, its justifi cation lies not in religion in the
narrow sense but in the laws of nature which are not just for a particular
people but for all human beings, based upon the universal human desire
for self-preservation and aimed at eliminating the “great enemy of nature,”
that is, violent death. 122 Th ese laws spell out a justifi cation for obedience to
the sovereign rooted in nature. Th ey explain why any sovereign who does
rule should be obeyed, and not how a sovereign comes to rule.
Th e law of nature, which is the foundation of this science, follows from
these premises. If this law were simply the result of introspection, it would
at best be a prudent suggestion. Its obligatory character, however, follows
from the fact that it is not merely rooted in nature but is the embedded
command of nature’s God. 123 We may fi nd this idea strange because we
imagine obligation to arise only from situations in which we have freely
given our consent. For Hobbes, however, there is nothing that is freely
given in an absolute sense. Everything we do, we do because we are in a
real sense pushed to do it. Obligation thus is not something chosen but
something imposed as a result of an unequal power relationship. We are
thus obliged only because we are commanded. 124
hobbes’ theology
While Hobbes was convinced that human beings could eliminate violent
death in a commonwealth ruled by an absolute sovereign, he also knew
that death itself was inevitable. Descartes had suggested in the Discourse
that science might eventually overcome death and indefi nitely extend human
life, but Hobbes was under no such illusions. Moreover, he knew that
the fear of death inevitably led to questions about the aft erlife, and that
such questions posed tremendous problems for political stability since the
possibility of gaining eternal life in some cases could outweigh the desire
to preserve this life. Th e proclamations of priests and the delusions of religious
fanatics about the nature of good and evil thus could become more
compelling than the commands of the sovereign and throw the state into
chaos. Th e Wars of Religion in his view were the result of such a state of
aff airs, and the only way to avoid this problem was for the sovereign to rule
both the church and the state. 125
While both offi ces must be united, Hobbes did not favor a theocracy. In
fact, the rule of priests with exclusive intercessionary powers or of inspired
saints was exactly what he feared. Such theocratic impulses in his view can
only be quelled by granting the civil sovereign both temporal and ecclesiastical
dominion. However, this solution, which is known as Erastianism,