Theological Origins of Modernity

230 chapter seven
Aristotle famously defi ned four causes, a material, formal, effi cient, and
fi nal cause of every eff ect. Th e material cause of a golden chalice, for example,
is the gold out of which it is made. While a chalice could be made
from many elements, it could not be made from air or water to take only
two examples. Th e gold is a cause in that it contributes to the chalice. Th e
formal cause is the shape of the chalice. Again, while a number of shapes
are possible, not all of them are since the chalice must hold liquids. Th e
effi cient cause is the means by which the chalice comes to be, in this case
the craft sman who chooses the material and form of the chalice to meet
the purpose or fi nal cause for which it is made. In making the chalice, the
craft sman thus does not create it or its idea out of nothing. Th e act of creation
is a form of mimēsis or imitation. Aristotle asserts that this notion of
the causes of things applies not merely to manmade things but to natural
things as well, many of which (e.g., all living things) have their effi cient
cause within themselves (e.g., the acorn has the capacity to form itself into
an oak).
Hobbes reworks this Aristotelian notion of causality. He recognizes
only a material and an effi cient cause. He sees the effi cient cause as the sum
total of all the motions that lead something to push on and move something
else and the material cause as the sum total of all the motions in the
thing that is pushed or moved. Together they constitute a necessary cause
in the presence of which the eff ect necessarily occurs. 76 In keeping with his
rejection of universals, he believes that formal and fi nal causes do not really
exist for natural objects but are really effi cient or material causes. Final
causes exist only for beings with reason and will. 77 Causality for Hobbes
thus becomes the aggregate interaction of all motions, or, to put the matter
in more theological terms, it is the purely indiff erent will of God that
has no rational form and no rational or natural end but consists in the
interacting motions of all things acting corporeally upon one another. 78
While Hobbes employs Aristotelian terminology to describe causality, he
thus rejects the via antiqua reading of Aristotle in favor of a via moderna
reading favored by Ockham and his followers.
Th e practical conclusion that follows from this account is that the world
of matter in motion is governed by an omnipotent God who is indiff erent to
our preservation and well-being. Hobbes was not the fi rst thinker to reach
this sobering conclusion. As we saw in chapters 2–4, both the humanists
and Reformers had recognized this fact. Hobbes holds a similar view of
God’s apparent indiff erence to human suff ering or thriving. In contrast to
both the humanists and Reformers, however, Hobbes does not accept this
view as fi nal but seeks to show, as we will see, that through the natural law