Theological Origins of Modernity

346 notes to pages 231–234
Martinich, Hobbes, 191. Damrosch argues in a related vein that Hobbes’ God is a
deus absconditus with a vengeance. Th e Reformation in his view stressed God’s
ever-present power, Hobbes his divine remoteness. “Hobbes as Reformation
Th eologian,” 346.
79. On this point see Tuck, “Hobbes and Descartes,” in Perspectives on Th omas
Hobbes, 13–40; as well as Amos Funkenstein, Th eology and the Scientifi c Imagination
from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1986), 80–86. As we will see, Hobbes also believes that we are
directed toward this science by the insight God gives us.
80. EW, 1:17.
81. For Hobbes, theory that cannot be practiced has no value. Martinich, Hobbes, 91.
82. Tuck, “Hobbes and Descartes,” 30.
83. Ibid., 31.
84. According to Ted Miller, Hobbes believes we reason by true fi ctions, but the purpose
of reasoning is to make the fi ctions come true. “Th omas Hobbes and the
Constraints that Enable the Imitation of God,” Inquiry 42, no. 2 (June, 1999): 160.
85. Elizabeth Brient has argued that theological voluntarism humbled human epistemological
pretension, so that hypothesis rather than theoria emerged as the
appropriate attitude when faced with the mute facticity of nature. “From Vita
Contemplativa to Vita Activa: Modern Instrumentalization of Th eory and the
Problem of Measurement,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9, no. 1
(2001): 23.
86. Like the natural world, this new one is created by the word. Hobbes, Leviathan,
280. Hobbes urges readers to imitate God, but he also suggests we can become
more dignifi ed by creating something new. Miller, “Th omas Hobbes and the Constraints,”
163.
87. Mersenne, “Ballistica,” in Th omas Hobbes Malmesburiensis opera philosophica
quae latine scripsit omnia, ed. Guliemi Molesworth, 5 vols. (London: Bohn, 1839–
45), 5:309. Th e summary of Hobbes’ work in the Meresenne essay was almost certainly
composed by Hobbes himself.
88. Ibid., 5:315.
89. EW, 1:91–92.
90. De Corpore, EW 1: 91–92.
91. Ibid., 1:1.
92. Ibid., 1:66.
93. Martinich points out that Hobbes is unwilling to subordinate geometry to arithmetic,
because he believes knowledge must be reducible to sensation. Th us numbers
have no independent reality and are merely names of points. Martinich,
Hobbes, 284.
94. Hobbes’ truths thus take a hypothetical form, but the connections they specify
are necessary. Hobbes believes, for example, that, “If x occurs, then y necessarily
follows.” Th is diff ers from the claim that the historian makes, which takes the
form, “When x occurred, y followed.” Obviously, the same event may occur in
the future under similar circumstances, but a great deal depends on how similar