Theological Origins of Modernity

156 chapter five
While many of Luther’s critics have come to the conclusion that it is
not Christian but Manichean, there is crucial diff erence between Luther’s
position and that of the Manicheans. For the Manicheans there is an actual
struggle between good and evil, the outcome of which is in doubt. In
Luther’s case God triumphs instantly. 87 Th ere are thus not two quasi-equal
Gods but one who manages the whole show. Here we see the continuing
impact of the nominalist notion of omnipotence. Hans Blumenberg has
suggested that divine omnipotence became a problem for late medieval
and early modern thought because of the inadequacy of Augustine’s solution
to the problem of Gnosticism. 88 Th is conclusion, however, is incorrect.
Th e problem is not the recurrence of divine dualism and a cosmological
struggle of good and evil. In fact, there is no cosmological struggle at all.
God’s absolute power makes that an impossibility. Th ere appears to be a
confl ict only from the perspective of individual human beings. Luther’s
notion is thus not Manichean but closer to the Stoic notion of a divine
logos or fate that determines all things. Th ere is nothing that can be done
to change this, and the only hope for individual human beings is that God
will tear them away from Satan and unite them with this logos and this
fate, making it their logos and their fate, thus liberating them from their
slavery. 89
Th e absolute supremacy of God, however, opens up a deeper and more
disturbing problem, for it turns the confl ict of good and evil, of God and
Satan, that is so central for Luther, into a sham, for Satan himself is clearly
a creature of God and therefore subordinate to his will. God is both good
and evil, and Christians therefore cannot become children of the light
without also becoming children of darkness. Th e Christian who like the
Stoic sage becomes one with the divine logos thus does not simply become
good but also evil. Th is is not, of course, what Luther asserts but it is the
concealed corollary of his argument.
As we discussed in the last chapter, divine omnipotence in this way
leads Luther to the notion of the deus absconditus or hidden God. Luther
recognized quite clearly that his understanding of divine power leaves no
possibility for any cause except God himself. Hence, while the great struggle
of good and evil that is won by Christ on the cross seems quite real, it is
also a deus ex machina, for as Luther himself recognized there is a divine
puppeteer behind the scene who brings the stage and all its characters into
being and moves them about as he wills. Th e source of all good and all evil
for Luther is and can only be God himself. Luther, however, believes that it
is crucial that this divine puppeteer remain concealed, and that Christians
focus not on him but on the speeches presented on his behalf by the puppets
on the stage. Th us, he argues: