Theological Origins of Modernity

descartes’ path to truth 189
this were the case, however, he would have no need to publish his work. In
fact he expects others to imitate his model and undertake a thorough selfexamination.
Th e crucial question, of course, is what he imagines the consequence
of such self-examination will be. Montaigne had made a similar
appeal with his Essays, and he seems to have believed that the result would
be a fl owering of human multiplicity, because he did not believe that any
two humans would ever reason alike. Th is was the inevitable conclusion of
a humanism that began with a notion of human individuality in Petrarch
and developed this notion to its conclusion in the Promethean individualism
of Pico and others. Descartes, by contrast, was convinced that anyone
who is freed from the prejudices of the world and uses his good sense will
arrive at exactly the same conclusions he did. Both the method and the
path of doubt lead to the same goal. Descartes thus hopes to transform European
society not as a whole all at once and from above, but from within
one person at a time. Moreover, as we will see, it is crucial that each individual
follow Descartes’ path on his own, for the truth of Cartesian science
can only be known through personal experience.
Th e fundamental principle and foundation of Descartes’ science is
cogito ergo sum. Th is is the thought that he believed everyone or nearly
everyone could experience if only they followed the path he laid out. Th is
is the basis of all Cartesian wisdom, and the Archimedean point on which
he believes humanity can stand to move the world. Th is principle, however,
can only be understood if we understand Descartes’ transformation
of metaphysics.
descartes’ reformulation of metaphysics
Th ere has been considerable debate over the last hundred years about Descartes’
originality, almost all of it bound up with a debate about the origin
and nature of modernity. Th e traditional view of Descartes growing out of
the Enlightenment was perhaps best summarized by Hegel, who claimed
in his History of Philosophy that when we come to Descartes we come home
to ourselves, out of otherness, home to subjectivity. 73 Modernity is thus
understood as the consequence of the Reformation and the development
of human inwardness. Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century, a
number of scholars, oft en neo-Th omist in inclination and antipathetic to
modernity and Descartes, tried to show that Descartes’ thought was not
as original as he had contended by showing the many ways in which he
drew upon scholasticism. Descartes in their view concealed the medieval
foundations of his new structure, building a “mechanic’s workshop” on a