Theological Origins of Modernity

the contradictions of enlightenment 265
profound that there was really little basis for an exchange of views that
could bring either of them to meaningfully alter his position. Th eir dialogue
thus is really more two monologues that present statements of their
opposing views. Th ese statements, however, are quite valuable because
they reveal the necessary and irremediable character of their disagreement
and thus the necessary and irremediable brokenness at the heart of
modernity.
Hobbes begins his critique of the Meditations by affi rming the truth
of Descartes’ demonstration in the fi rst meditation that sense-deception
calls into question the reality of external objects. On this point he and
Descartes agree. Indeed, as we saw above, it is this crucial point that is behind
the modern eff ort to discover an underlying rational order that is not
accessible to the senses. Hobbes, however, points out that Descartes’ argument
is not original but merely repeats the arguments of Plato, that is to
say, of the Academic skeptics, a point which Descartes admits in his reply.
What is surprising about this assertion and Descartes’ agreement with
it is that it is manifestly false. Th e crucial diff erence between the argument
in the Discourse and in the Meditations is the claim that the ultimate
source of skepticism is the possibility of deception by an omnipotent
God. Th is argument, however, appears nowhere in Plato or the Academic
or Pyrrhonian skeptics. One could plausibly suspect that Hobbes merely
builds here on his earlier critique of the Discourse (where Descartes does
not refer to divine omnipotence) and simply overlooks the importance of
the role of God in this context, but he asserts later that Descartes’ whole
argument depends upon a demonstration that God is not a deceiver. It thus
seems unlikely he overlooks the importance of this point here.
What is more important to Hobbes seems to be the assertion at the very
beginning that Descartes’ claims are not new, and that he is thus not modern.
By tying Descartes to Plato in this way, Hobbes attempts to connect
him to a dualistic (Catholic) metaphysics of body and soul that Hobbes
believes is outmoded and deeply complicit in the religious confl icts of the
time. As we have seen, Descartes does draw on Plato (and Plato’s Christian
follower Augustine), but he certainly is less Platonic than Hobbes suggests.
Why then does he agree with Hobbes on this point? Th e most likely explanation
for his willingness to allow this mischaracterization or exaggeration
of his position is that he is anxious to appear less revolutionary
to his Catholic audience (and especially the doctors of the Sorbonne) than
he actually is. 19 What is certainly clear is that both thinkers are aware of
how crucial the question of the nature and relation of God and man is in
this context.