Theological Origins of Modernity

hobbes’ fearful wisdom 223
Descartes hoped that his new science might indefi nitely extend human
life, he had little to say about how such long-lived beings could live peacefully
with one another. Th e idea of generosity he developed in the Passions
points to something like a humanist notion of friendliness, but it does not
deal with the desire for property, the longing for preeminence, or the preference
for one’s own that have been enduring sources of human confl ict. It
is thus hard to see why Descartes’ scientifi cally empowered, freely acting
human beings would peacefully co-exist, sharing the mastery and possession
of nature rather than using their vast powers to kill, dominate,
and exploit one another. Hobbes, by contrast, confronts these questions
directly, leaving no doubt about the importance of his science for the political
and theological struggles of his age.
Hobbes’ attempt to develop a comprehensive science has led to questions
about the coherence of its parts. 58 He had a general idea of the variety
of the sciences and a vision of the hierarchy of knowledge, but he was never
as certain as Descartes about how all the separate branches of science fi t
into his larger tree of knowledge. On this matter, Hobbes is actually closer
to Bacon, who saw himself initiating a new science, mobilizing humanity
to engage in a scientifi c investigation of a whole variety of areas without
a fi nal idea of the exact relation of these areas to one another. Hobbes remained
similarly unclear about how these fi elds would fi t together, but
that is more an indication of his honesty than any attempt to camoufl age
basic incompatibilities. Indeed, in comparison to Descartes, who was convinced
from his initial letter to Beeckman until near the end of his life
that he could complete his science without external assistance and provide
humanity with an explanation for everything, Hobbes recognized the vast
scope of his endeavor and the insuperable diffi culties facing anyone who
wanted a thorough knowledge of the whole.
Th is question of the coherence of Hobbes’ science is a central issue for
Hobbes scholarship. While everyone admits Hobbes sought to develop a
mechanistic science that could explain the motions of all natural and human
bodies, there is considerable disagreement whether he succeeded in
doing so. At the heart of this debate is the question of the relationship of
his natural science to his anthropology and political science, a question
which Hobbes addressed on several occasions and to which he gave varying
answers. Many scholars accept Hobbes’ claim that his political science
follows from his natural science. Others such as Leo Strauss and Quentin
Skinner see a disjunction between the two.
For Strauss the early Hobbes was a humanist, not so much in the school
of Petrarch or Ficino as in that of Machiavelli. Strauss believes that, af-