Theological Origins of Modernity

306 notes to pages 52–54
the attempt to create a self-enclosed fi ctional universe that rejects time and history
and makes the self the idolatrous counterpart of God. Worlds, 3. Such a view,
however, wrongly assimilates Petrarch’s notion of the individual to the Cartesian
notion of subjectivity. For Petrarch the self is always in and of the world. It is not
a res cogitans over and against a res extensa. It constantly struggles with the world
but the world is not an alien other.
48. Th e disordered mind of the impetuous lover, in Petrarch’s view, knows no peace.
See his Africa, trans. T. G. Bergin and A. S. Wilson (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1977), 88.
49. Drawing on Cicero, Petrarch asserts in his Coronation oration that passion and
the desire for glory are essential to any great work of spirit. Hans Baron, “Petrarch:
His Inner Struggles and the Humanistic Discovery of Man’s Nature,” in
Florilegium historiale (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 30.
50. In this respect, Petrarch found the Romans superior to Greeks because they
avoided excessively intellectualizing the question of virtue. Foster, Petrarch, 151.
On the question of moral virtue, Petrarch fi rmly believed that Romans had improved
what they received from Greeks. Whitfi eld, Petrarch and the Renascence,
103 and 107.
51. Jerrold Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism: Th e Union of
Eloquence and Wisdom, Petrarch to Valla (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1968), 58.
52. Mazzotta, Worlds, 117.
53. Ibid., 118.
54. Trinkaus, Scope, 353.
55. Later in life, Petrarch became increasingly interested in Caesar and wrote an extensive
life of him as well, entitled De gestis Caesaris. He apparently never believed
that he was as virtuous as Scipio, but was attracted to him against his sympathies
by his greatness. Foster, Petrarch, 156.
56. Petrarch, Africa, x. Th is is refl ected as well in Petrarch’s critique of Pompey for
not destroying Caesar earlier when he had the chance. Th is view has no parallel in
medieval thought. Baron, “Petrarch,” 27.
57. Africa, 70–77.
58. Foster, Petrarch, 148.
59. Africa, 166.
60. Ibid., 37, 227. Scipio, however, in a certain sense is merely emblematic for the
Roman people themselves. Ibid., 74.
61. “For well schooled, the leader of the victorious hosts had marked Fate’s oscillations
and ‘gainst every chance prepared himself.” Ibid., 126.
62. Th is picture of Scipio is quite similar to Petrarch’s later vision of the characteristics
of a good prince. According to Petrarch, the prince should be lovable, just,
promote public works, be careful in the use of public funds, contribute to new
taxes, avoid cruelty and excessive delegation of power, cherish friendship, and
be free from vanity and overweening pride. Wilkins, Life, 242–43. Th e power of
this idea is evident in its continuing impact many years later on Erasmus. See