Theological Origins of Modernity

notes to pages 201–205 339
ence, and to be the principle of oneself, that is, to have one’s life and work under
command. Later, in the Passions of the Soul, Descartes will give this autarchy the
name ‘génerosité’—the key and coping-stone of all the other virtues.” Lachterman,
“Descartes and the Philosophy of History,” 43.
128. Replies, AT 7:144; CSM 2:103.
129. Replies, AT 7:165; CSM 2:116–17.
130. Replies, AT 7:106–7; CSM 2:77, 88. One might note that this is a proof of the existence
of perfection and not of God per se.
131. Oedingen, “Der Genius Malignus,” 182; Harry G. Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers,
and Madmen: Th e Defense of Reason in Descartes’ Meditations (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 172. Th us, according to Descartes, an atheist cannot attain
certainty and cannot be a scientist. AT 7:139; CSM 2:99; cf. also Replies, AT 7:384;
CSM 2:263.
132. On this point I follow Marion’s argument in “Th e Essential Incoherence of Descartes’
Conception of Divinity,” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, ed. Amélie
Rorty (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 297–338.
133. Th at said, Anselm does not believe that God is therefore entirely incomprehensible.
In fact, he argues that despite his inaccessibility God is the light that
makes everything else comprehensible. Th e connection to the Platonic tradition
is palpable.
134. Where Descartes sees God sub specie infi nitatis, Bonaventure sees him sub specie
divinitatis. Itinerarium mentis in Deum 3.4. See Koyré, Descartes und die
Scholastik, 115–17.
135. Jean Marie Beyssade, “Création des vérités éternelles et doubte metaphysique,”
Studia Cartesiana 2 (1981): 93; and Marion, “Essential Incoherence,” 303–7.
136. Descartes to Clersellier, 1646, AT 4:445–46; Descartes to Hyperaspistas, August
1641, AT 3:427.
137. Replies, AT 7:367–68; CSM 2:253.
138. Replies, AT 7:371; CSM 2:256.
139. Principles, AT 8A:15; CSM 1:202, Descartes to Chanut, June 6, 1647, AT 5:51. Margaret
Wilson suggests the infi nite/indefi nite distinction may be a ploy since Descartes
characterizes the human will as infi nite. Margaret Wilson, “Can I Be the
Cause of My Idea of the World? (Descartes on the Infi nite and the Indefi nite),” in
Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, 349–50.
140. Replies, AT 7:112; CSM 2:81.
141. Replies, AT 7:111–12, 365; CSM 2: 80, 252.
142. Th e Cartesian understanding of the relation of God and nature is thus the culmination
of the mystical identifi cation of the cosmos with the divine that began, as
we saw in chapter 1, with Meister Eckhart.
143. Or as Soff er puts it: “Cartesian nature has become de-theologized by means of a
divine inscrutability as the personifi cation of Cartesian mechanics.” From Science
to Subjectivity, 155.
144. Th is reading of Descartes’ ontological argument pushes Descartes in the direction
of Spinoza, who sees God as unthinking substance, Fichte, who sees God as an