Theological Origins of Modernity

150 chapter five
For Erasmus it is crucial not that God be omnipotent but that he be
good. 60 He thus tries to counterbalance Luther’s argument in order to
preserve divine goodness and promote human responsibility. If humans
did not have some degree of freedom, it is diffi cult to see how God could
act justly in punishing sinners or what incentives humans could have to
act morally. Erasmus was well aware that his position might be seen as Pelagian
and tried to show why it was not. In his view there were fi ve diff erent
competing positions on this issue. Pelagians believe that extraordinary
works of charity or virtue can win salvation without grace. Scotists believe
man is able to do morally good works without grace that merit salvation. 61
Augustine believes that salvation requires grace alone but does not abolish
the human will, which works in coordination with grace. Karlstadt
believes that grace is essential and that the will is only free to do evil. And
fi nally, Luther believes that grace is the source of everything and that the
will is free to do neither good nor evil. Erasmus considers the positions of
Pelagius, Karlstadt and Luther to be unorthodox, that of Scotus acceptable
but incorrect, and that of Augustine best and closest to his own.
Erasmus believed that Christ’s sacrifi ce gave human beings the chance
to accept or reject grace when God off ered it to them. Th is sacrifi ce, however,
did not entirely restore them to their prelapsarian state. In contrast to
Adam before the Fall, the human will is now biased toward evil. 62 Humans
consequently need God’s further assistance in completing the project that
their free choice begins with its acceptance of grace. Erasmus thus asserts
that while human beings owe the beginning and end of their redemption to
God, the middle depends chiefl y on them. He consequently contends that
his position is both Augustinian and orthodox. But is this the case?
Th ere is some reason to doubt that Erasmus sincerely holds the view he
describes here. Elsewhere he asserts that free will is “a power of the will,
by means of which man is able to apply himself or turn away from the
things that lead to eternal salvation.” 63 Th is statement seems to attribute
much more to the will than the position outlined above. When discussing
this matter, he also at times does not mention grace at all or suggests that
nature itself is grace in the Neoplatonic manner we noted in Ficino. 64 Th is
view is certainly problematic for most Christians, and it is hard to fi nd
anyone other than Erasmus who defi nes man’s natural freedom in terms
of a supernatural goal without mentioning grace. 65 Th is point is further
strengthened by the fact that Erasmus draws no distinction between natural
and acquired freedom, which seems to imply that grace is not needed
to help man regain his freedom. He thus seems to believe that the fallen
will is not enslaved by sin. Given all this, it is diffi cult to see how Erasmus’s