Theological Origins of Modernity

descartes’ path to truth 193
his deepest refl ections because he is concerned, as he himself admits, that
they would be “too metaphysical” for a popular audience. He spells these
out more fully in the Meditations.
Th e Meditations was originally written in Latin, but it was soon translated
into French (perhaps by Descartes himself and certainly with his assistance),
which made it available to a broader audience. Moreover, it was
published not just on its own but with a series of objections appended to it
by noted thinkers of the time, followed by Descartes’ replies. It was almost
certainly written to answer questions that had arisen about the Discourse
and should be seen as a continuation or deepening of the argument presented
there. 89 Th is connection is also made apparent in the text, for the
fi rst few paragraphs of the Meditations summarize the material in parts
1–3 of the Discourse. Th e Meditations is also written in an autobiographical
fashion, but in contrast to the Discourse, it is in a dramatic and not a
narrative form. Th e work thus has a greater immediacy for the reader. Th e
Discourse presented readers with a life of good sense that they might imitate;
the Meditations leads them step by step through the process, forcing
them (at least vicariously) to follow the path of doubt to what Descartes
believes is its inevitable conclusion.
Th e First Meditation retraces the path of doubt delineated in part 4 of
the Discourse. Descartes lists the traditional sources of doubt drawn from
ancient skepticism, illusions of sense, madness, and dreams, and concludes
that while these might call into question the truths of physics they do not
call into question the truths of mathematics. Th e ultimate source of doubt
in the Meditations, however, is not simply the possibility of human error
(which can be minimized or perhaps even eliminated by the consistent
application of the method) but the possibility that we are deceived in an
irremediable way by an omnipotent God. Such a God may have created
us so that we necessarily misperceive the world, or he may have created
the world such that we are continually misled, or he may even interfere
with our minds or intervene in the order of nature to deceive us in an ad
hoc manner. 90 Th e mere possibility that such a God exists is suffi cient to
call into question the apparently most certain truths, that is, mathematical
intuitions. 91 In this light, the whole of Cartesian science might rest on
a faulty foundation.
Th is possibility leads Descartes to the methodological hypothesis of an
evil genius who continually deceives us. Th is assumption, he argues, will
prevent him from falling into error by treating as false anything that is dubitable.
On the basis of this assumption, he is then able to determine that
the external world and all the abstract entities (and truths) of mathematics