Theological Origins of Modernity

notes to pages 244–247 349
116. While Hobbes’ sovereign must enforce a uniform religious practice, there is much
greater space for freedom of conscience or belief. On this question see Joshua
Mitchell, “Th omas Hobbes: On Religious Liberty and Sovereignty,” in Religious
Liberty in Western Th ought, ed. Noel Reynolds and W. Cole Durham Jr (Atlanta:
Scholars Press, 1996). In his political theological reading of Hobbes, Schmitt saw
liberty of conscience as the defect that brought the mighty Leviathan down. Carl
Schmitt, Th e Leviathan in the State Th eory of Th omas Hobbes (London: Greenwood,
1996), 56. See also Vatter, “Strauss and Schmitt,” 189–90.
117. Martinich, Two Gods, 306.
118. Leviathan, 272; see also 464.
119. According to Martinich, the power of God is absent from the primary state of
nature and therefore there is no law and no injustice, but they do exist in the secondary
state of nature in which the law of God is the law of nature. Two Gods, 76.
120. Th e source of human misery for Hobbes is pride in the biblical sense as the refusal
to subordinate oneself to authority. Martinich, Two Gods, 74. Like Luther Hobbes
sees pride as the principal form of sin. His concern with pride, however, has more
to do with relations among human beings than relations with God. As Alan Ryan
points out, pride for Hobbes is incurable. Abundance cannot choke it, it demands
the abasement of others, and it must therefore be crushed. “Hobbes and Individualism,”
in Perspectives on Th omas Hobbes, 103.
121. Leviathan, 275.
122. Th us, while Hobbes favors a Christian commonwealth, it is not inconceivable that
he would accept other forms of religious states as legitimate.
123. Elements of Law, 97. See also EW 3:346; and Martinich, Two Gods, 97. Martinich
suggests that for Hobbes the law of nature is both a divine command and deducible
from self-preservation. He also suggests that he may have derived this view
from Suarez. Two Gods, 134.
124. It is thus not the quantity of power but inequality in power that generates an obligation.
Martinich, Two Gods, 94. Th is is a voluntarist position similar to that of
Ockham.
125. Mitchell points out that while reason can work to preserve us in this life, it cannot
help us win eternal life, which depends on Scripture. A full account of sovereignty
must thus rely on both. “Luther and Hobbes,” 691.
126. Martinich asserts that Hobbes had a strong emotional and intellectual attachment
to Calvinism and the Anglican Church. Two Gods, 1.
127. Willis Glover, “God and Th omas Hobbes,” in Hobbes Studies, ed. Keith C. Brown
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 148. Mintz, Hunting of Leviathan,
44. P. Geach, “Th e Religion of Th omas Hobbes,” in Th omas Hobbes: Critical
Assessments, 4:283.
128. Anecdotal evidence confi rms Hobbes’ religiosity. See Martinich, Two Gods, 24.
While there are fi deistic elements in Hobbes’ thought, he relies more on Scripture
than most fi deists. See ibid., 347; Glover, “God and Th omas Hobbes,” 159; and
Tuck, “Christian Atheism,” 114.