Theological Origins of Modernity

348 notes to pages 239–243
inhabit. Similarly, Hobbes’ construction may be valid for our world, but without
a justifi cation of the starting points we cannot know this to be the case. Th e selfreading
of a madman might be consistent but not valid or generalizable.
107. EW 1:8.
108. Leviathan, 58. While Hobbes might agree with Machiavelli that most people want
to be left alone, he does not agree that it is only a few oppressors that upset the
apple cart.
109. Th e similarity to Luther’s argument that we need to pass through despair to fi nd
grace is palpable and striking.
110. In the end for Hobbes all sane men will run just as Hector, despite his courage,
does in the Iliad. Only the suicidally insane will follow the path of Achilles.
111. Hobbes, Elements of Law, 87. See also Martinich, Two Gods, 80.
112. God thus cannot be relegated to the background in the way Martinich suggests.
Two Gods, 98.
113. Hobbes in many ways is simply reaffi rming the position of James I: “Th e state of
monarchy is the supremest thing upon earth; for kings are not only God’s lieutenants
upon earth, and sit upon God’s throne, but even by God himself are called
gods . . . for that they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power upon
earth.” King James VI and I, “A Speech to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament
at White-Hall, on Wednesday Th e XXI. Of March, Anno 1609,” Political
Writings, ed. Johann Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 181. See also A. P. Martinich, Hobbes: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), 15.
114. Building on Kojeve’s account of the warrior developed in his Hegel lectures,
Strauss argued in his 1936 Hobbes book that the Leviathan is meant to restrain
such men. Hobbes’ Leviathan, however, could never have restrained such men
since their chief characteristic (according to Kojeve and Hegel) is their willingness
to die rather than submit. Th e Leviathan might simply kill them all, but who
would do the killing if not other warriors? Hobbes’ argument, in contrast to that
of Hegel, Kojeve, and Strauss, seems to depend upon the universal fear of violent
death, the strength of the sovereign in meting it out, and the continuing fear of a
terrifying God in fostering obedience when the sovereign is distant or asleep. Although
to be fair to the more liberal reading of Hobbes, the continued rule of the
sovereign over a long period of time would inevitably routinize human motion
in pathways that minimized confl ict and fostered cooperation. Indeed, the rules
regulating human motion and thus minimizing human collisions could over time
become so well established that the visible force of the sovereign and the overarching
terror of the omnipotent God could retreat into the background in favor of
the rule of law. Th e operative word here, however, is ‘retreat’ not ‘disappear.’ In
Hobbes’ view even in a settled society with a population habituated to act in selfinterested
but cooperative ways, the absolute power of the sovereign is essential to
peace and prosperity.
115. MacDuff makes this point in Macbeth 4.3.50–100.