Theological Origins of Modernity

notes to pages 193–196 337
90. Some scholars believe that this Cartesian claim that everything in the world may
be an illusion is meaningless, since if this is the case there is only a nominal difference
between illusion and reality. See, for example, O. K. Bousma, “Descartes’
Evil Genius,” in Meta-Meditations: Studies in Descartes, ed. Alexander Sesonske
and Noel Fleming (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1965). Th is would only be true,
however, if Descartes’ God were a consistent deceiver, and there is no evidence
that this is the case.
91. On this point see Karlo Oedingen, “Der ‘genius malignus et summe potens et
callidus’ bei Descartes,” Kant-Studien 50 (1958–59): 178–87; Popkin, Skepticism,
178–79.
92. It is true that in the Synopsis Descartes says that one would have to be mad to
believe in such things, but this might be an eff ort to mask his skepticism in order
to defl ect potential criticism by the church.
93. Descartes to Mersenne, August 14, 1634, June 22, 1637, and October 11, 1638, AT
1:305, 392; 2:380.
94. AT 1:135.
95. AT 1:151.
96. AT 4:110.
97. AT 5:223–24. See also Descartes to Henri More, February 5, 1649 (AT 5:275), and
Descartes to Clersellier, April 23, 1649 (AT 5:377, 545). Stephen Nadler argues that
Descartes has a more radical notion of divine omnipotence than the nominalists.
“Scientifi c Certainty and the Creation of Eternal Truths: A Problem in Descartes,”
Southern Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 2 (1987): 175–91.
98. AT 1:135–36.
99. Margaret Osler suggests: “In God willing and knowing are a single thing in such
a way that by the very fact of willing something he knows it and it is only for this
reason that such a thing is true.” Th us, any change in divine understanding would
entail divine imperfection. “Eternal Truths and the Laws of Nature: Th e Th eological
Foundations of Descartes’ Philosophy of Nature,” Journal of the History of
Ideas 46, no. 3 (July-Sept. 1985): 352. Th is interpretation, however, can hardly suffi
ce, since God could, for example, in principle will from and for all eternity that
one plus two not equal three on Th ursday. Hence, while his will might be unvarying,
from the human point of view it could still appear to be contradictory.
100. WA 18:605.32; LW 33:24 (see chap. 4, note 13 for abbreviations).
101. Th is position, represented by Copernicus and Kepler, was not merely dangerous
to religion in Descartes’ view but also to physics. See Gérard Simon, “Les vérités
éternelles de Descartes, evidences ontologiques,” Studia Cartesiana 2 (1981): 133.
102. Hiram Caton, Th e Origin of Subjectivity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973);
Walter Soff er, From Science to Subjectivity: An Interpretation of Descartes’ Meditations
(New York: Greenwood, 1987), 19–40. Th is notion does seem to confront us
with a problem. If a radical materialism is even more likely to lead us into error,
why is the supposition of an omnipotent God or an evil genius necessary at all?
Th e answer to this lies in the distinction between the origin of doubt and the solution
to doubt. Sheer materialism for Descartes is more likely to lead to deception,
but it is in principle remediable through a strict application of the method. An