Theological Origins of Modernity

224 chapter seven
ter his discovery of Euclid, Hobbes developed a mechanistic science on
a radically new foundation but that he was unable to explain human beings
and political life mechanistically and fell back on a vitalistic account
more characteristic of humanism. 59 Strauss thus sees Machiavelli lurking
behind Hobbes’ political science, but he sees this disguised by the scientifi c
veneer he derives from Euclid and Galileo. He consequently argues that
while Hobbes does develop a new mechanistic science, this science cannot
really explain human action especially in the context of political communities.
Hobbes’ supposed political science is thus in the end only a kind of
political prudence. Moreover, in reducing human action to the pursuit of
self-interest, Hobbes in Strauss’s view diminishes the importance of higher
motives such as nobility or piety and like Machiavelli lowers the sights of
the modern age.
Skinner, too, believes that Hobbes was unable to construct his political
science on a simply mechanistic foundation. He argues that aft er Hobbes
returned to England in 1615 he devoted himself to the studia humanitatis. 60
In contrast to Strauss, Skinner sees this as the study not of philosophy but
of rhetoric. Th e Th ucydides edition and his synopsis of Aristotle’s Rhetoric
were the product of this dedication. Skinner suggests, however, that aft er
Hobbes discovered Euclid and published De cive he was in revolt against
humanism. 61 However, this too was unsatisfying, as Hobbes realized during
the Civil War that he could only have a broader impact if he employed
rhetoric. Consequently he combined rhetoric and science in the Leviathan
to construct his political science.
While these views have had a powerful impact, they are not universally
shared. Noel Malcolm, for example, is representative of a competing view
that sees Hobbes’ natural and political science as independent of one another
but parallel, diff ering not in principle but in type, the fi rst based on
Hobbes’ resolutive method (analysis) and the second on his compositive
method (construction). 62 Both, however, are scientifi c. Other scholars are
more dismissive of the idea of a disjunction, which they believe rests on
a misunderstanding of Renaissance science. As Reik points out, Hobbes
himself simply does not recognize a diff erence between his humanistic
and scientifi c work. 63
Many of those who see a disjunction in Hobbes’ thought put great weight
on Hobbes’ discovery of Euclid (or the infl uence of Galileo) in explaining
the origins and nature of his science. Such an explanation is not convincing.
On closer examination, Aubrey’s account of the supposed discovery
of Euclid is hard to swallow. Th e 47th Proposition is a stunning proof, but
Hobbes was almost certainly acquainted with it long before coming to Ge-