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popper-logic-scientific-discovery

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probability 157<br />

which the corresponding sequence of relative frequencies is convergent.<br />

This restriction amounts to introducing an axiom of convergence.<br />

(The problems connected with this axiom will not be dealt<br />

with until sections 63 to 66, since it turns out to be convenient to<br />

discuss them along with the ‘law of great numbers’.)<br />

Thus we shall be concerned only with mathematical sequences. Yet we<br />

shall be concerned only with those mathematical sequences of which<br />

we expect, or conjecture, that they approximate, as regards frequencies,<br />

to empirical sequences of a chance-like or random character; for these are our main<br />

interest. But to expect, or to conjecture, of a mathematical sequence<br />

that it will, as regards frequencies, approximate to an empirical<br />

one is nothing else than to frame a hypothesis—a hypothesis about the<br />

frequencies of the empirical sequence. 1<br />

The fact that our estimates of the frequencies in empirical random<br />

sequences are hypotheses is without any influence on the way we may<br />

calculate these frequencies. Clearly, in connection with finite classes, it<br />

does not matter in the least how we obtain the frequencies from which<br />

we start our calculations. These frequencies may be obtained by actual<br />

counting, or from a mathematical rule, or from a hypothesis of some<br />

kind or other. Or we may simply invent them. In calculating frequencies<br />

we accept some frequencies as given, and derive other frequencies<br />

from them.<br />

The same is true of estimates of frequencies in infinite sequences.<br />

Thus the question as to the ‘sources’ of our frequency estimates is<br />

not a problem of the calculus of probability; which, however, does not<br />

mean that it will be excluded from our discussion of the problems of<br />

probability theory.<br />

In the case of infinite empirical sequences we can distinguish two<br />

main ‘sources’ of our hypothetical estimates of frequencies—that is to<br />

say, two ways in which they may suggest themselves to us. One is an<br />

estimate based upon an ‘equal-chance hypothesis’ (or equi-probability<br />

hypothesis), the other is an estimate based upon an extrapolation of<br />

statistical findings.<br />

1 Later, in sections 65 to 68, I will discuss the problem of decidability of frequency hypotheses,<br />

that is to say, the problem whether a conjecture or hypothesis of this kind can be<br />

tested; and if so, how; whether it can be corroborated in any way; and whether it is<br />

falsifiable. *Cf. also appendix *ix.

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