25.01.2013 Views

popper-logic-scientific-discovery

popper-logic-scientific-discovery

popper-logic-scientific-discovery

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS
  • No tags were found...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

178<br />

some structural components of a theory of experience<br />

probabilities; to assume, that is to say, that for one and the same property<br />

there can be one and only one probability p, within one and the<br />

same reference sequence.<br />

However, the difficulty of defining a unique probability concept<br />

without the limit axiom can easily be overcome. We may introduce the<br />

requirement of uniqueness (as is, after all, the most natural procedure)<br />

as the last step, after having postulated that the sequence shall be ‘absolutely<br />

free’. This leads us to propose, as a solution of our problem, the<br />

following modification of our definition of chance-like sequences, and<br />

of objective probability.<br />

Let α be an alternative (with one or several middle frequencies). Let<br />

the ones of α have one and only one middle frequency p that is ‘absolutely<br />

free’; then we say that α is chance-like or random, and that p is<br />

the objective probability of the ones, within α.<br />

It will be helpful to divide this definition into two axiomatic<br />

requirements.* 2<br />

(1) Requirement of randomness: for an alternative to be chancelike,<br />

there must be at least one ‘absolutely free’ middle frequency, i.e.<br />

its objective probability p.<br />

(2) Requirement of uniqueness: for one and the same property of<br />

one and the same chance-like alternative, there must be one and only one<br />

probability p.<br />

The consistency of the new axiomatic system is ensured by the<br />

example previously constructed. It is possible to construct sequences<br />

which, whilst they have one and only one probability, yet possess no<br />

frequency limit (cf. section b of appendix iv). This shows that the new<br />

axiomatic demands are actually wider, or less exacting, than the old<br />

ones. This fact will become even more evident if we state (as we may)<br />

our old axioms in the following form:<br />

(1) Requirement of randomness: as above.<br />

* 2 It is possible to combine the approach described in note *1 to section 57, and in<br />

appendices iv and *vi, with these two requirements by retaining requirement (1) and<br />

replacing requirement (2) by the following:<br />

(+ 2) Requirement of finitude: the sequence must become, from its commencement,<br />

as quickly n-free as possible, and for the largest possible n; or in other words, it must be<br />

(approximately) a shortest random-like sequence.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!