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330<br />

new appendices<br />

There are three main characteristics which distinguish a theory of<br />

this kind from others. (i) It is formal; that is to say, it does not assume<br />

any particular interpretation, although allowing for at least all known<br />

interpretations. (ii) It is autonomous; that is to say, it adheres to the<br />

principle that probability conclusions can be derived only from probability<br />

premises; in other words, to the principle that the calculus of<br />

probabilities is a method of transforming probabilities into other probabilities.<br />

(iii) It is symmetrical; that is to say, it is so constructed that<br />

whenever there is a probability p(b, a)—i.e. a probability of b given a—<br />

then there is always a probability p(a, b) also—even when the absolute<br />

probability of b, p(b), equals zero; that is, even when p(b) = p(b, aā) = 0.<br />

Apart from my own attempts in this field, a theory of this kind,<br />

strange to say, does not seem to have existed hitherto. Some other<br />

authors have intended to construct an ‘abstract’ or ‘formal’ theory—<br />

for example Kolmogorov—but in their constructions they have always<br />

assumed a more or less specific interpretation. For example, they assumed<br />

that in an equation like<br />

p(a, b) = r<br />

the ‘elements’ a and b are statements, or systems of statements; or they<br />

assumed that a and b are sets, or systems of sets; or perhaps properties;<br />

or perhaps finite classes (ensembles) of things.<br />

Kolmogorov writes 2 ‘The theory of probability, as a mathematical<br />

discipline, can and should be developed from axioms in exactly the<br />

same way as geometry and algebra’; and he refers to ‘the introduction<br />

of basic geometric concepts in the Foundations of Geometry by Hilbert’, and<br />

to similar abstract systems.<br />

And yet, he assumes that, in ‘p(a, b)’—I am using my own symbols,<br />

not his—a and b are sets; thereby excluding, among others, the <strong>logic</strong>al<br />

But if this formula is added to our system, then it can be proved that there are exactly two<br />

elements in S. The examples by which we prove, below, the consistency of our axioms<br />

show however that there may be any number of elements in S. This shows that (0), and<br />

all similar formulae determining the number of elements in S, cannot be derived; nor can<br />

the negations of these formulae be derived. Thus our system is incomplete.<br />

2 The quotations here are all from p. 1 of A. Kolmogorov, Foundation of the Theory of Probability,<br />

1950. (First German edition 1933.)

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