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popper-logic-scientific-discovery

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418<br />

new appendices<br />

(vii) If C(x) = C(y) ≠ 1, then C(x, u) � C(y, w) whenever P(x, u) �<br />

P(y, w).* 3<br />

(viii) If x entails y, then: (a) C(x, y) � 0; (b) for any given x, C(x, y) and<br />

C(y) increase together; and (c) for any given y, C(x, y) and P(x)<br />

increase together. 6<br />

(ix) If x¯ is consistent and entails y, then: (a) C(x, y) � 0; (b) for any<br />

given x, C(x, y) and P(y) increase together; and (c) for any given<br />

y, C(x, y) and P(x) increase together.<br />

10. All our considerations, without exception, may be relativized<br />

with respect to some initial information z; adding at the appropriate<br />

places phrases like ‘in the presence of z, assuming P(z, zz¯) ≠ 0’. The<br />

relativized definition of the degree of confirmation becomes:<br />

(10.1)<br />

where<br />

(10.2)<br />

C(x, y, z) = E(x, y, z) (1 + P (x, z) P(x, yz))<br />

P(y, xz) − P(y, z)<br />

E(x, y, z) =<br />

P(y, xz) + P(y, z)<br />

E(x, y, z) is the explanatory power of x with respect to y, in the presence<br />

of z. 7<br />

11. There are, I believe, some intuitive desiderata which cannot be<br />

satisfied by any formal definition. For example, a theory is the better<br />

confirmed the more ingenious our unsuccessful attempts at its refutation<br />

have been. My definition incorporates something of this idea—if<br />

* 3 The condition ‘≠ 1’ was printed neither in the original text, nor in the published<br />

corrections.<br />

6 (vii) and (viii) contain the only important desiderata which are satisfied by P(x, y).<br />

7 Let x1 be Einstein’s gravitational theory; x 2 Newton’s; y the (interpreted) empirical<br />

evidence available today, including ‘accepted’ laws (it does not matter if none or one or<br />

both of the theories in question are included, provided our conditions for y are satisfied);<br />

and z a part of y, for example, a selection from the evidence available one year ago. Since<br />

we may assume that x 1 explains more of y than x 2, we obtain C(x 1, y, z) � C(x 2, y, z) for<br />

every z, and C(x 1, y, z) >C(x 2, y, z) for any suitable z containing some of the relevant initial<br />

conditions. This follows from (vi)—even if we have to assume that P(x 1, yz) = P(x 2,<br />

yz) = P(x 1) = P(x 2) = 0.

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