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popper-logic-scientific-discovery

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432<br />

new appendices<br />

statistical interpretations may be used as excellent and weighty<br />

test-statements.* 4<br />

Thus our analysis shows that statistical methods are essentially<br />

hypothetical-deductive, and that they proceed by the elimination of<br />

inadequate hypotheses—as do all other methods of science.<br />

10. If δ is very small, and therefore also P(e)—which is possible<br />

only for large samples—then we have, in view of (6),<br />

(7)<br />

P(e, h) ≈ P(e, h) − P(e).<br />

In this case, and only in this case, it will therefore be possible to<br />

accept Fisher’s likelihood function as an adequate measure of degree<br />

of corroboration. We can interpret, vice versa, our measure of degree of<br />

corroboration as a generalization of Fisher’s likelihood function; a generalization<br />

which covers cases, such as a comparatively large δ, in which Fisher’s<br />

likelihood function would become clearly inadequate. For the likelihood<br />

of h in the light of the statistical evidence e should certainly not<br />

reach a value close to its maximum merely because (or partly because)<br />

the available statistical evidence e was lacking in precision.<br />

It is unsatisfactory, not to say paradoxical, that statistical evidence e,<br />

based upon a million tosses and δ = 0.00135, may result in numerically<br />

* 4 This point is of considerable interest in connection with the problem of the numerical<br />

value of the absolute probabilities needed for the determination of C(x, y), i.e. the<br />

problem discussed under point 3 of the ‘Second Note’, and also in the present note (see<br />

especially footnote *1). Had we to determine the absolute probability of the ‘total<br />

available evidence’ consisting of the conjunction of a large number of observational<br />

reports, then we should have to know the absolute probability (or ‘width’) of each of<br />

these reports, in order to form their product, under the assumption (discussed in appendix<br />

*vii above) of the absolute independence of these reports. But in order to determine<br />

the absolute probability of a statistical abstract, we do not have to make any assumptions<br />

concerning either the absolute probability of the observational reports or their<br />

independence. For it is clear, even without assuming a Laplacean distribution, that (6)<br />

must hold for small values of δ, simply because the content of e must be always a measure<br />

of its precision (cf. section 36), and thus absolute probability must be measured by the width<br />

of e, which is 2δ. A Laplacean distribution, then, may be accepted merely as the simplest<br />

equiprobability assumption leading to (6). It may be mentioned, in this context, that the<br />

Laplacean distribution may be said to be based upon a universe of samples, rather than a<br />

universe of things or events. The universe of samples chosen depends, of course, upon<br />

the hypothesis to be tested. It is within each universe of samples that an assumption of<br />

equiprobability leads to a Laplacean (or ‘rectangular’) distribution.

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