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popper-logic-scientific-discovery

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appendix *vii 389<br />

and ‘ ’.) The use of these symbols can be explained by the following<br />

rules:<br />

(1) ‘C(a) C(b)’ and thus its equivalent ‘p(b) p(a)’ may be used<br />

to state that the content of a is greater than that of b—at least in the sense<br />

of the fine structure of content. We shall thus assume that C(a) C(b)<br />

entails C(a) C(b), and that this in turn entails C(a) � C(b), that is to<br />

say, the falsity of C(a) C(b) always entails C(a) C(b).<br />

(4) Corresponding rules will hold for p(a) p(b), etc.<br />

The problem now arises of determining the cases in which we may<br />

say that C(a) C(b) holds even though we have C(a) = C(b). A number<br />

of cases are fairly clear; for example, unilateral entailment of b by a.<br />

More generally, I suggest the following rule:<br />

If for all sufficiently large finite universes (that is, for all universes<br />

with more than N members, for some sufficiently large N), we have<br />

C(a) >C(b), and thus, in accordance with rule (3), C(a) C(b), we<br />

retain C(a) C(b) for an infinite universe even if, for an infinite<br />

universe, we obtain C(a) = C(b).<br />

This rule seems to cover most cases of interest, although perhaps not<br />

all. 15<br />

The problem of a1 = ‘All planets move in circles’ and a2 = ‘All planets<br />

move in ellipses’ is clearly covered by our rule, and so is even the case<br />

of comparing a1 and a3 = ‘All planets move in ellipses with an eccentricity<br />

other than zero’; for p(a3)>p(a1) will hold in all sufficiently<br />

large finite universes (of possible observations, say) in the simple sense<br />

that there are more possibilities compatible with a3 than with a1. *<br />

15 Related problems are discussed in considerable detail in John Kemeny’s very stimulating<br />

paper ‘A Logical Measure Function’, Journal of Symb. Logic 18, 1953, pp. 289 ff.<br />

Kemeny’s model language is the second of three to which I allude on p. xxiv of my<br />

Preface, 1958. It is, in my opinion, by far the most interesting of the three. Yet as he<br />

shows on p. 294, his language is such that infinitistic theorems—such as the principle<br />

that every number has a successor—must not be demonstrable in it. It thus cannot<br />

contain the usual system of arithmetic.

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