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popper-logic-scientific-discovery

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234<br />

some structural components of a theory of experience<br />

the group before disturbing it (so long, of course, as this would not<br />

enable us to use our knowledge so as to effect a forbidden selection).<br />

But there is no way of obtaining any such knowledge concerning the<br />

single electrons without disturbing them. To conclude, it remains true<br />

that precise single predictions are impossible.’<br />

To this objection I should first reply that it would not be surprising if<br />

it were correct. It is after all obvious that from a statistical theory exact<br />

singular predictions can never be derived, but only ‘indefinite’ (i.e.<br />

formally singular) single predictions. But what I assert at this stage is<br />

that although the theory does not supply any such predictions, it does not<br />

rule them out either. One could speak of the impossibility of singular<br />

predictions only if it could be asserted that disturbing the system or<br />

interfering with it must prevent every kind of predictive measurement.<br />

‘But that is just what I assert’, my opponent will say. ‘I assert, precisely,<br />

the impossibility of any such measurement. You assume that it is<br />

possible to measure the energy of one of these moving electrons without<br />

forcing it out of its path and out of the electron group. This is the<br />

assumption which I regard as untenable. For assuming that I possessed<br />

any apparatus with which I could make such measurements, then I<br />

should with this or some similar apparatus be able to produce aggregates<br />

of electrons which all (a) were limited as to their position, and (b) had<br />

the same momentum. That the existence of such aggregates would<br />

contradict the quantum theory is, of course, your view too, since it is<br />

ruled out by your own ‘scatter relations’, as you call them. Thus you<br />

could only reply that it is possible to conceive of an apparatus which<br />

would allow us to take measurements but not to make selections. I<br />

admit that this answer is <strong>logic</strong>ally permissible; but as a physicist I can<br />

only say that my instincts revolt against the idea that we could measure<br />

the momenta of electrons while being unable to eliminate, for instance,<br />

all those whose momentum exceeds (or falls short of) some given<br />

amount.’<br />

My first answer to this would be that it all sounds quite convincing.<br />

But a strict proof of the contention that, if a predictive measurement is<br />

possible, the corresponding physical selection or separation would also<br />

be possible, has not been given (and it cannot be given, as will be seen<br />

soon). None of these arguments prove that the precise predictions<br />

would contradict the quantum theory. They all introduce an additional

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