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popper-logic-scientific-discovery

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corroboration, or how a theory stands up to tests 281<br />

With the idol of certainty (including that of degrees of imperfect<br />

certainty or probability) there falls one of the defences of obscurantism<br />

which bar the way of <strong>scientific</strong> advance. For the worship of this idol<br />

hampers not only the boldness of our questions, but also the rigour<br />

and the integrity of our tests. The wrong view of science betrays itself<br />

in the craving to be right; for it is not his possession of knowledge, of<br />

irrefutable truth, that makes the man of science, but his persistent and<br />

recklessly critical quest for truth.<br />

Has our attitude, then, to be one of resignation? Have we to say that<br />

science can fulfil only its bio<strong>logic</strong>al task; that it can, at best, merely<br />

prove its mettle in practical applications which may corroborate it? Are<br />

its intellectual problems insoluble? I do not think so. Science never<br />

pursues the illusory aim of making its answers final, or even probable.<br />

Its advance is, rather, towards an infinite yet attainable aim: that of ever<br />

discovering new, deeper, and more general problems, and of subjecting<br />

our ever tentative answers to ever renewed and ever more rigorous<br />

tests.<br />

This is the end of the text of the original book.<br />

The Appendices i–vii which are here printed on<br />

pp. 285–310 were also part of that original edition.<br />

Addendum, 1972<br />

In the preceding chapter of my book (which was the final chapter) I<br />

tried to make clear that by the degree of corroboration of a theory I mean a<br />

brief report that summarizes the way in which the theory has stood up<br />

to tests, and how severe these tests were.<br />

I have never deviated from this view; see for example the beginnings<br />

of the new Appendices *vii, p. 378; *ix, p. 406; and especially the last<br />

section (*14) of *ix, pp. 441 f. Here I wish to add the following points:<br />

(1) The <strong>logic</strong>al and methodo<strong>logic</strong>al problem of induction is not<br />

insoluble, but my book offered a negative solution: (a) We can never<br />

rationally justify a theory, that is to say, our belief in the truth of a theory, or<br />

in its being probably true. This negative solution is compatible with the<br />

following positive solution, contained in the rule of preferring theories<br />

which are better corroborated than others: (b) We can sometimes rationally

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