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popper-logic-scientific-discovery

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some observations on quantum theory 227<br />

The statistically interpreted theory, therefore, not only does not rule<br />

out the possibility of exact single measurements, but would be untestable,<br />

and thus ‘metaphysical’, if these were impossible. So the fulfilment<br />

of Heisenberg’s programme, the elimination of metaphysical<br />

elements, is here achieved, but by a method the very opposite of his.<br />

For while he tried to exclude magnitudes which he regarded as<br />

inadmissible (though without entirely succeeding), I invert the<br />

attempt, so to speak, by showing that the formalism which contains<br />

these magnitudes is correct just because the magnitudes are not metaphysical.<br />

Once we have given up the dogma embodied in Heisenberg’s limitation<br />

upon attainable precision, there is no longer any reason why we<br />

should doubt the physical significance of these magnitudes. The scatter<br />

relations are frequency predictions about paths; and therefore these<br />

paths must be measurable—in precisely the same way as, say, throws of<br />

five must be empirically ascertainable—if we are to be able to test our<br />

frequency predictions about these paths, or about these throws.<br />

Heisenberg’s rejection of the concept of path, and his talk of ‘nonobservable<br />

magnitudes’, clearly show the influence of philosophical<br />

and especially of positivistic ideas. Under the same influence, March<br />

writes: ‘One may say perhaps without fear of being misunderstood . . .<br />

that for the physicist a body has reality only in the instant in which he<br />

observes it. Naturally nobody is so mad as to assert that a body ceases to<br />

exist the moment we turn our backs to it; but it does cease, in that<br />

moment, to be an object of inquiry for the physicist, because there<br />

exists no possibility of saying anything about it which is based on<br />

experiment.’ 2 In other words, the hypothesis that a body moves in this<br />

or that path whilst it is not being observed is non-verifiable. This, of<br />

momenta allow us to calculate their values back to the place where the position was<br />

selected, and measured, by the slit. And this ‘calculation of the past history’ of the<br />

particle (cf. note 3 to section 73) is essential; without it, we could not assert that we were<br />

measuring the momenta immediately after the positions were selected; and thus we<br />

could not assert that we were testing the scatter relations—which we do in fact with any<br />

experiment which shows an increase of scatter as a consequence of a decrease of the<br />

width of a slit. So it is only the precision of the prediction which becomes ‘blurred’ or<br />

‘smeared’ in consequence of the scatter relations, but never the precision of a measurement.<br />

2 March, Die Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik, p. 1. *Reichenbach’s position is similar; it is<br />

criticized in my Postscript, section *13.

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