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popper-logic-scientific-discovery

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(An example of an interpretation of ‘pa(x 1)’ in the sense of (3), i.e. of<br />

the <strong>logic</strong>al interpretation, is the concept ‘<strong>logic</strong>al probability’ as used by<br />

me in a previous publication. 1 )<br />

Now it is possible to proceed with the whole construction from the<br />

other end: instead of introducing ‘p(x 1, x 2)’ as primitive concept<br />

(primitive functor) of an axiom system s 1 and defining ‘pa(x 1)’<br />

explicitly, we can construct another axiom system s 2 in which ‘pa(x 1)’<br />

appears as (undefined) primitive variable, and we can then proceed to<br />

define ‘pa(x 1,x 2)’ explicitly, with the help of ‘pa(x 1)’; as follows.<br />

Df 2<br />

p(x 1, x 2) = pa(x 1x 2)<br />

pa(x 2)<br />

appendix *ii 323<br />

The formulae adopted in s 1 as axioms (and Df 1) now become theorems<br />

within s 2, i.e. they can be deduced with the help of the new system of<br />

axioms s 2.<br />

It can be shown that the two methods described—the choice of s 1<br />

and Df 1, or s 2 and Df 2 respectively—are not equally convenient from<br />

the viewpoint of formal axiomatics. The second method is superior to<br />

the first in certain respects, the most important of which is that it is<br />

possible to formulate in s 2 an axiom of uniqueness which is much<br />

stronger than the corresponding axiom of s 1 (if the generality of s 1 is<br />

not restricted). This is due to the fact that if pa(x 2) = 0, the value of<br />

p(x 1, x 2) becomes indeterminate.* 2<br />

A system of independent axioms, s 2, as described above, is here<br />

subjoined. (It is easy to construct a system s 1 with the help of it.)<br />

Combined with definition Df 2 it is sufficient for the deduction of the<br />

mathematical theory of probability. The axioms can be divided into<br />

two groups. Group A is formed by the axioms for the junctional<br />

6 See Popper, l.c., 71, 151.<br />

* 2 The absolute system (s 2) has an advantage over the relative system (s 1) only as long as<br />

the relative probability p(x, y) is considered as indeterminate if pa(y) = 0. I have since<br />

developed a system (see appendix *iv) in which relative probabilitiés are determinate<br />

even in case pa(y) = 0. This is why I now consider the relative system superior to the<br />

absolute system. (I may also say that I now consider the term ‘axiom of uniqueness’ as<br />

badly chosen. What I intended to allude to was, I suppose, something like postulate 2 or<br />

axiom A2 of the system of appendix *iv.)

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