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popper-logic-scientific-discovery

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394<br />

new appendices<br />

each entry represents one of the relative-atomic statements. (We can, of<br />

course, make the representation three-dimensional, by marking the<br />

position with a pin whose length represents the time, measured from<br />

some assumed zero instant; and variations in the colour of the pinhead<br />

may be used to indicate the names of the various planets.)<br />

It has been explained, mainly in sections 40 to 46, and in my old<br />

appendix i, how the minimum number of the relative-atomic statements<br />

needed to refute a certain theory could be used as a measure of<br />

the complexity of the theory. And it was shown that the formal simplicity<br />

of a theory might be measured by the paucity of its parameters, in so far as<br />

this paucity was not the result of a ‘formal’ rather than a ‘material’<br />

reduction in the number of the parameters. (Cf. especially sections 40,<br />

44, f., and appendix i.)<br />

Now all these comparisons of the simplicity of theories, or of their<br />

contents, will, clearly, amount to comparisons of the ‘fine-structure’ of<br />

their contents, in the sense explained in the preceding appendix,<br />

because their absolute probabilities will all be equal (that is, equal to<br />

zero). And I wish first to show that the number of the parameters of a<br />

theory (with respect to a field of application) can indeed be interpreted<br />

as measuring the fine-structure of its content.<br />

What I have to show, to this end, is that for a sufficiently large finite universe,<br />

the theory with the greater number of parameters will always be more probable (in the<br />

classical sense) than the theory with the smaller number of parameters.<br />

This can be shown as follows. In the case of a continuous geometrical<br />

field of applications, our universe of possible events, each<br />

described by a possible relative-atomic statement, is of course infinite.<br />

As shown in sections 38 f., we can in this case compare two theories<br />

with respect to the dimension, rather than the number, of the possibilities<br />

which they leave open; that is, the possibilities which are favourable to<br />

them. The dimension of these possibilities turns out to be equal to the<br />

number of parameters. We now replace the infinite universe of relativeatomic<br />

statements by a finite (although very large) universe of relativeatomic<br />

statements, corresponding to the chessboard example in the<br />

preceding appendix. 2 That is to say, we assume that every relativeatomic<br />

statement refers to a little square with the side ε as the position of<br />

2 Cf. appendix *vii, text to note 12.

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