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appendix *x 463<br />

But I think I have shown that even if we have solved the problem of<br />

<strong>logic</strong>ally analysing subjunctive (or ‘nomic’) conditionals, we cannot<br />

hope to define dispositional terms, or universal terms, operationally.<br />

For universals, or dispositional terms, transcend experience, as<br />

explained here under points 1 and 2, and in section 25 of the book.<br />

Addendum, 1968<br />

Since this appendix was first published in 1959, there has been a very<br />

interesting reply from William Kneale, B.J.P.S. 12, 1961, p. 99 ff.,<br />

and a criticism by G. C. Nerlich and W. A. Suchting, B.J.P.S. 18, 1967,<br />

p. 233 ff., to which I replied, B.J.P.S. 18, 1967, p. 316 ff. I do not now<br />

think that my reply is very good. In fact, it is only after reconsidering<br />

Kneale’s criticism that I realised what is at the bottom of our<br />

disagreement.<br />

It is, I now think, the fact that most philosophers regard definitions<br />

as important, and that they have never taken my assurance seriously<br />

that I do regard them as unimportant. I neither believe that definitions<br />

can make the meaning of our words definite, nor do I think it worth<br />

bothering about whether or not we can define a term (though it may<br />

sometimes be moderately interesting that a term can be defined with<br />

the help of terms of a certain kind); for we do need undefined primitive<br />

terms in any case.<br />

I may perhaps sum up my position by saying that, while theories and<br />

the problems connected with their truth are all-important, words and<br />

the problems connected with their meaning are unimportant. (Cp.<br />

Conjectures and Refutations, 3rd edition, 1968, point (9) on p. 28.)<br />

For this reason I am not really very interested in either the definition<br />

or in the definability of ‘natural necessity’; though I am interested in<br />

the fact (for I believe that it is a fact) that the idea is not meaningless.<br />

Least of all am I interested in establishing the fact (if it is a fact,<br />

which I regard as doubtful) that a modal term can be defined with the<br />

help of non-modal terms. If I have given the impression that this is<br />

what I wanted to show, I have certainly given the wrong impression.

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