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popper-logic-scientific-discovery

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238<br />

some structural components of a theory of experience<br />

‘non-predictive’ measurements, namely (a) measurement of two positions,<br />

(b) measurement of position preceded or (c) succeeded by a<br />

measurement of momentum. The above discussed measurement by<br />

means of a filter in front of a film strip of a Geiger-counter exemplifies<br />

(b), i.e. a selection according to momentum followed by a measurement<br />

of position. This is presumably just that case which, according to<br />

Heisenberg (cf. section 73), permits ‘a calculation about the past of the<br />

electron’. For while in cases (a) and (c) only calculations for the time<br />

between the two measurements are possible, it is possible in case (b) to<br />

calculate the path prior to the first measurement, provided this measurements<br />

was a selection according to a given momentum; for such a<br />

selection does not disturb the position of the particle.* 3 Heisenberg, as<br />

we know, questions the ‘physical reality’ of this measurement, because<br />

it permits us to calculate the momentum of the particle only upon its<br />

arrival at a precisely measured position and at a precisely measured<br />

time: the measurement seems to lack predictive content because no<br />

testable conclusion can be derived from it. Yet I shall base my imaginary<br />

experiment, intended to establish the possibility of precisely predicting<br />

the position and momentum of a definite particle, upon this<br />

particular measuring arrangement which at first sight is apparently<br />

non-predictive.<br />

As I am about to derive such far-reaching consequences from the<br />

assumption that precise ‘non-predictive’ measurements of this type<br />

are possible, it seems proper to discuss the admissibility of this<br />

assumption. This is done in appendix vi.<br />

With the imaginary experiment that follows here, I directly challenge<br />

the method of arguing which Bohr and Heisenberg have used<br />

in order to justify the interpretation of the Heisenberg formulae as<br />

* 3 This statement (which I tried to base upon my discussion in appendix vi) was<br />

effectively criticized by Einstein (cf. appendix *xii), is false and so my imaginary experiment<br />

collapses. The main point is that non-predictive measurements determine the path<br />

of a particle only between two measurements, such as a measurement of momentum<br />

followed by one of position (or vice versa); it is not possible, according to quantum theory,<br />

to project the path further back, i.e. to the region of time before the first of these<br />

measurements. Thus the last paragraph of appendix vi is mistaken; and we cannot know,<br />

of the particle arriving at x (see below) whether it did come from P, or from somewhere<br />

else. See also note **on p. 232.

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