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popper-logic-scientific-discovery

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probability 179<br />

(2) Requirement of uniqueness: as above.<br />

(2′) Axiom of convergence: for one and the same property of one and<br />

the same chance-like alternative there exists no further middle<br />

frequency apart from its probability p.<br />

From the proposed system of requirements we can deduce<br />

Bernoulli’s theorem, and with it all the theorems of the classical calculus<br />

of probability. This solves our problem: it is now possible to deduce<br />

the law of great numbers within the framework of the frequency theory<br />

without using the axiom of convergence. Moreover, not only does the<br />

formula (1) of section 61 and the verbal formulation of Bernoulli’s<br />

theorem remain unchanged, 5 but the interpretation we have given to<br />

it also remains unchanged: in the case of a chance-like sequence without<br />

a frequency limit it will still be true that almost all sufficiently long<br />

sequences show only small deviations from p. In such sequences (as in<br />

chance-like sequences with frequency limits) segments of any length<br />

behaving quasi-divergently will of course occur at times, i.e. segments<br />

which deviate from p by any amount. But such segments will be comparatively<br />

rare, since they must be compensated for by extremely long<br />

parts of the sequence in which all (or almost all) segments behave<br />

quasi-convergently. As calculation shows, these stretches will have to<br />

be longer by several orders of magnitude, as it were, than the<br />

divergently-behaving segments for which they compensate.* 3<br />

This is also the place to solve the ‘fundamental problem of the theory of<br />

chance’ (as it was called in section 49). The seemingly paradoxical inference<br />

from the unpredictability and irregularity of singular events to the<br />

applicability of the rules of the probability calculus to them is indeed<br />

valid. It is valid provided we can express the irregularity, with a fair<br />

degree of approximation, in terms of the hypothetical assumption that<br />

one only of the recurring frequencies—of the ‘middle frequencies’—<br />

so occurs in any selection according to predecessors that no after-effects<br />

5 The quasi-Bernoulli formulae (symbol: F′) also remain unambiguous for chancelike<br />

sequences (according to the new definition), although ‘F′’ now symbolizes only a<br />

middle frequency.<br />

* 3 I am in full agreement with what follows here, even though any reference to ‘middle<br />

frequencies’ becomes redundant if we adopt the method described in section 57, note<br />

*1, and appendix iv.

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