25.01.2013 Views

popper-logic-scientific-discovery

popper-logic-scientific-discovery

popper-logic-scientific-discovery

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS
  • No tags were found...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

466<br />

new appendices<br />

a gravitational field may proceed on curved paths. This use is important<br />

and legitimate.<br />

The main purpose of this note is to issue a warning against what<br />

may be called the apologetic use of imaginary experiments. This use goes back, I<br />

think, to the discussion of the behaviour of measuring rods and clocks<br />

from the point of view of special relativity. At first these experiments<br />

were used in an illustrative and expository way—a perfectly legitimate<br />

usage. But later, and in the discussion of quantum theory, they were<br />

also used, at times, as arguments, both in a critical and in a defensive or<br />

apologetic mood. (In this development, an important part was played<br />

by Heisenberg’s imaginary microscope through which one could<br />

observe electrons; see points 9 and 10 below.)<br />

Now the use of imaginary experiments in critical argumentation is,<br />

undoubtedly, legitimate: it amounts to an attempt to show that certain<br />

possibilities were overlooked by the author of a theory. Clearly, it must<br />

also be legitimate to counter such critical objections, for example, by<br />

showing that the proposed imaginary experiment is in principle<br />

impossible, and that here, at least no possibility was overlooked. 4 An<br />

imaginary experiment designed in a critical spirit—designed in order<br />

to criticize a theory by showing that certain possibilities have been<br />

overlooked—is usually permissible, but great care must be taken with<br />

the reply: in a reconstruction of the controversial experiment, undertaken<br />

in defence of the theory, it is, more particularly, important not to<br />

introduce any idealizations or other special assumptions unless they are<br />

favourable to an opponent, or unless any opponent who uses the<br />

imaginary experiment in question would have to accept them.<br />

(2) More generally, I think that the argumentative use of imaginary<br />

experiments is legitimate only if the views of the opponent in the<br />

argument are stated with clarity, and if the rule is adhered to that the<br />

idealizations made must be concessions to the opponent, or at least acceptable to<br />

the opponent. For example, in the case of Carnot’s cycle all idealizations<br />

introduced increase the efficiency of the machine, so that the opponent<br />

to the theory—who asserts that a heat machine can produce<br />

4 For example, my own experiment of section 77 has been shown to be in principle<br />

impossible (from the quantum-theoretical point of view) by Einstein in his letter printed<br />

in appendix *xii; see the note on p. 232 and notes *3 and *4 to section 77.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!