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popper-logic-scientific-discovery

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questions about the origins or ‘sources’ of our estimates. (Cf. section<br />

2.) It is more important, in my opinion, to be quite clear about the fact<br />

that every predictive estimate of frequencies, including one which we<br />

may get from statistical extrapolation—and certainly all those that refer<br />

to infinite empirical sequences—will always be pure conjecture since it<br />

will always go far beyond anything which we are entitled to affirm on<br />

the basis of observations.<br />

My distinction between equal-chance hypotheses and statistical<br />

extrapolations corresponds fairly well to the classical distinction<br />

between ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’ probabilities. But since these terms<br />

are used in so many different senses, 3 and since they are, moreover,<br />

heavily tainted with philosophical associations, they are better<br />

avoided.<br />

In the following examination of the axiom of randomness, I shall<br />

attempt to find mathematical sequences which approximate to random<br />

empirical sequences; which means that I shall be examining<br />

frequency-hypotheses.* 2<br />

58 AN EXAMINATION OF THE AXIOM<br />

OF RANDOMNESS<br />

probability 159<br />

The concept of an ordinal selection (i.e. of a selection according to<br />

position) and the concept of a neighbourhood-selection, have both<br />

been introduced and explained in section 55. With the help of these<br />

concepts I will now examine von Mises’s axiom of randomness—the<br />

principle of the excluded gambling system—in the hope of finding a<br />

weaker requirement which is nevertheless able to take its place. In von<br />

Mises’s theory this ‘axiom’ is part of his definition of the concept of a<br />

collective: he demands that the limits of frequencies in a collective shall<br />

be insensitive to any kind of systematic selection whatsoever. (As he<br />

3 Born and Jordan, for instance, in Elementare Quantenmechanik, 1930, p. 308, use the first of<br />

these terms in order to denote a hypothesis of equal distribution. A. A. Tschuprow, on the<br />

other hand, uses the expression ‘a priori probability’ for all frequency hypotheses, in order to<br />

distinguish them from their statistical tests, i.e. the results, obtained a posteriori, of empirical<br />

counting.<br />

* 2 This is precisely the programme here alluded to in note *1 above, and carried out in<br />

appendices iv and *vi.

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