25.01.2013 Views

popper-logic-scientific-discovery

popper-logic-scientific-discovery

popper-logic-scientific-discovery

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS
  • No tags were found...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

284<br />

appendices<br />

it is connected with the fact that a theory always prohibits some ‘homotypic’<br />

events, as we have called them (i.e. a class of occurrences which<br />

differ only in their spatio-temporal co-ordinates; cf. sections 23 and<br />

31). For this reason, spatio-temporal co-ordinates will, in general,<br />

appear in the schema which generates the field of application, and<br />

consequently the field of the relatively atomic statements will, in<br />

general, show a topo<strong>logic</strong>al and even a metrical order.<br />

The proposed definition says: A theory t is called ‘d-dimensional<br />

with respect to the field of application F’ if and only if the following<br />

relation holds between t and F: there is a number d such that (a) the<br />

theory does not clash with any d-tuple of the field and (b) any given<br />

d-tuple in conjunction with the theory divides all the remaining<br />

relatively atomic statements uniquely into two infinite sub-classes A<br />

and B, such that the following conditions are satisfied: (α) every<br />

statement of the class A forms, when conjoined with the given dtuple,<br />

a ‘falsifying d + 1-tuple’ i.e. a potential falsifier of the theory;<br />

(β) the class B on the other hand is the sum of one or more, but<br />

always a finite number, of infinite sub-classes [B i] such that the conjunction<br />

of any number of statements belonging to any one of these<br />

subclasses [B i] is compatible with the conjunction of the given<br />

d-tuple and the theory.<br />

This definition is intended to exclude the possibility of a theory’s<br />

having two fields of application such that the relatively atomic statements<br />

of one field result from the conjunction of the relatively<br />

atomic statements of the other (this must be prevented if the field of<br />

application is to be identifiable with that of its graphic representation;<br />

cf. section 39). I may add that by means of this definition the<br />

problem of atomic statements (cf. note 2 to section 38) is solved in a<br />

manner which might be described as ‘deductivist’, since the theory<br />

itself determines which singular statements are relatively atomic (with<br />

respect to the theory). For it is the theory itself through which the<br />

field of application is defined—and with it the statements which<br />

because of their <strong>logic</strong>al form have equal status with respect to the<br />

theory. Thus the problem of the atomic statements is not solved by<br />

the <strong>discovery</strong> of statements of some elementary form out of which<br />

the other, more composite, statements are built up inductively, or<br />

composed by the method of truth-functions. On the contrary, the

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!