2454 final report.pdf - Agra CEAS Consulting

Evaluation of the Community Plant Health Regime: Final Report
DG SANCO Evaluation Framework Contract Lot 3 (Food Chain)
Specific cost survey results
Q1.5.b 1) Extent to which the cost sharing scheme is an appropriate tool to encourage compliance with
measures that reduce the risks for others
13 out of 21 MS CAs consider that cost sharing scheme is an appropriate tool to encourage compliance with
measures that reduce the risks for others (7 MS CAs and 4 stakeholders out of 6 do not know)
Q1.5.b 2) Extent to which the cost sharing scheme is an appropriate tool to gain collaboration in
controlling outbreaks
13 out of 21 MS CAs and 2 out of 6 stakeholders consider that cost sharing scheme is an appropriate tool to gain
collaboration in controlling outbreaks (7 MS CAs and 2 stakeholders do not know)
MS CAs consider such schemes to be appropriate in that they encourage enforcement and
compliance: private operators can only benefit from the scheme if they have complied with
the legal requirements, for instance eradication measures but also use of hygiene protocol,
testing material in advance etc. However, the compensation paid by governments after an
outbreak often rely on ad hoc actions and, as discussed above, mutual funds or insurance
schemes are not applicable in all sectors at the same level or under the same conditions.
As highlighted in a study conducted by Imperial College London on Responsibility and Cost
Sharing Schemes Options for Quarantine Plant Health 233 , levy- and insurance-based cost
sharing options for outbreak control are difficult to establish where an industry is complex
and the direct benefits of outbreak control to business are less evident. This applies to some
horticultural production, particularly ornamentals, and the broader ―environmental sector‖
which makes ornamental plantings, where plant health threat has an environmental, public
good component. In these cases, options involving government contributions to outbreak
control costs may be the best way to ensure compliance and protection of public goods.
In conclusion, costs and responsibility sharing schemes are generally considered to be the
appropriate tool to provide incentives for government and private operator enforcement and
compliance. The choice of tools (government contributions; private sector based) needs to be
pursued on a case by case basis, where feasible. The generalised application of private sector
schemes is constrained by industry specificities and structures and where plant health threat
has an environmental, public good component. In such cases, there are strong arguments for
government supported compensation schemes.
3.11.8 Direct costs and losses of mandatory destruction of plant materials
As indicated above a major gap in the current solidarity regime is considered to be the
exclusion of coverage for the costs and losses incurred by private operators. It is noted that
there is lack of quantitative information regarding costs and losses for private operators. This
issue was specifically addressed by the cost survey and during interviews with stakeholders
but virtually no quantitative data was provided. Therefore, estimating the potential scale of
coverage of these costs under the solidarity regime remains impossible at present.
Costs and losses to private operators in case of HO outbreak can be direct or indirect, as
follows:
233 Responsibility and Cost Sharing Options for Options for Quarantine Plant Health, Centre for Environmental
Policy, Imperial College London, July 2007
Food Chain Evaluation Consortium 248