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2454 final report.pdf - Agra CEAS Consulting

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Evaluation of the Community Plant Health Regime: Final Report<br />

DG SANCO Evaluation Framework Contract Lot 3 (Food Chain)<br />

5.7 Incentives<br />

5.7.1 Background<br />

A major issue explored by the evaluation is the availability of incentives at all level, to<br />

stimulate the various organisations involved in implementing the CPHR to take responsibility<br />

for the plant health chain as a whole.<br />

The evaluation of the CPHR during the last two decades has demonstrated the importance of<br />

prevention, rapid notification, early action and appropriate implementation of surveillance,<br />

eradication and emergency and – ultimately – containment and control plans, all of which<br />

emerged as key elements for the success of plant health strategies. Currently there is a lack of<br />

incentives for ensuring these elements are approximately and sufficiently in place. This<br />

deficiency is evident at various levels, e.g. for private operators (grower/trader) depending on<br />

sector, as well as at the level of the CAs.<br />

The lack of incentives may undermine the achievement of the regime‘s objectives, as has been<br />

demonstrated by some failures of the system in the past. It is crucial therefore to establish<br />

clear lines of responsibility and roles for all actors via the proportionate structuring of<br />

incentives and sanctions.<br />

General survey results (Q 7.9):<br />

How should organizational aspects be developed and improved in future to ensure the effective implementations<br />

of plant health provisions?<br />

- With regard to incentives, the introduction of compensation to operators for mandatory destruction of infested<br />

material is considered as an incentive for timely <strong>report</strong>ing by 21 out of 24 MS CA and 12 out of 22<br />

stakeholders (1MS CA and 7 MS do not know) and as an incentive for the effective implementation of<br />

control measures by 21 out of 24 MS CA and 13 out of 23 stakeholders (0 MS Ca and 5 stakeholders do not<br />

know);<br />

- The increased use of sanctions for the timely <strong>report</strong>ing of outbreaks is supported by 16 out of 24 MS CAs and<br />

5 out of 23 stakeholders (3 MS CA and 10 stakeholders do not know); its increased use for the effective<br />

implementation of control measures is supported by15 out of 23 MS CAs and 6 out of 23 stakeholders (2 MS<br />

CA and 8 stakeholders do not know);<br />

- 17 out of 24 MS CAs and 9 out of 23 stakeholders (4MS CA and 9 stakeholders do not know) are in favour of<br />

the introduction of liability between producers as a form of incentive for the effective implementation of<br />

control measures;<br />

- Delegation of tasks and duties to other bodies is opposed by 15 out of 24 MS CAs and is supported by 9 out<br />

of 23 stakeholders (3 MS CA and 4 stakeholders do not know); more centralization of tasks and duties to the<br />

‗Responsible Official Bodies‘ is supported by 11 out 24 MS CAs and rejected by 15 out of 23 stakeholders (6<br />

MS CA and 6 stakeholders do not know);<br />

- The increase in funding for plant health services at MS level is supported by 22 out of 24 MS CAs and 17 out<br />

of 23 stakeholders (1 MS CA and 7 stakeholders do not know); the re-definition of priorities within the<br />

national PH budget by 16 out of 25 MS CAs and 11 out of 24 stakeholders (3 MS CA and 12 stakeholders do<br />

not know).<br />

Food Chain Evaluation Consortium 363

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