Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

104 Presuppositions and Pronouns
sentences in terms of material implication, and it is well known that this
construal is a problematic one. However, as we have seen in § 3.2, the proviso
problem will remain even if we adopt the Stalnaker/Lewis analysis of
conditionals, for example. What this means is that if we adopt this construal,
the satisfaction theory still predicts that the (a) and (b) sentences have the
same presupposition, the only difference being that the conditional is no
longer construed as material implication but as a relation between possible
states of affairs. It would be premature to conclude from this observation
that there is no analysis of conditionals that will solve the problem, but it
does suggest that this line of defence isn't very promising, either.
Another way of approaching the problem would be to deny that the
conditionals involved in the (a) and (b) sentences in (26)-(28) are of the
same type, and to argue on this basis that these sentence pairs don't give rise
to the same presuppositions. There are at least two problems with this idea.
First, it will have to be shown on independent grounds that in the (a)
sentences if... . then is construed differently than in the corresponding (b)
sentences, and it is by no means obvious how that can be done. Secondly, it
is clear that such an argument wouldn't work for the following minimal pairs:
(29) a. Maybe Fred knows that if Barney is sensible, then he will stop
smoking.
b. Maybe Fred knows that if Barney is sensible, then he is a
habitual smoker.
(30) a. Maybe Fred knows that if Betty is married, then Wilma's
husband should be more discreet.
b. Maybe Fred knows that if Betty is married, then Wilma has a
husband (too).
Intuitively, while (29a) presupposes that Barney is a habitual smoker, (29b)
doesn't seem to have this presupposition, and analogously, (30a) but not
(30b) presupposes that Wilma has a husband. But of course there is no
reason whatsoever for believing that the conditionals in the (a) sentences are
construed differently from those in the (b) sentences.
3.4 The argument from improbability
I believe that the objections that I have mustered in the foregoing warrant
the conclusion that the argument from truth-functionality is not just wrong
but entirely on the wrong track: the problems it faces are so serious that it
calls for replacement rather than repair. One possible replacement might be
the following argument, which is based on the same assumptions as