Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
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162 <strong>Presuppositions</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Pronouns</strong><br />
general: if a presupposition can be bound in the belief context in which it<br />
arises, the binding theory predicts that this will in fact happen.<br />
If a presupposition X % is is triggered in a belief report on a subject a, a, <strong>and</strong> X %<br />
cannot be bound, we predict that X % will be accommodated in the main DRS.<br />
For example, it is predicted that, by default, (53a) will be interpreted as<br />
presupposing that there is a manager:<br />
(53) a. Wilbur believes that the manager is a crook.<br />
b. [p, q: W believes p & q, q = p+[x: manager x. x, crook x]]<br />
c. [x, p, q: manager x, W believes p & q, q = p+[x: crook x]]<br />
In (53b) the presupposition that there is a manager cannot be bound, <strong>and</strong><br />
there<strong>for</strong>e the binding theory predicts that, in the absence of a suitable<br />
antecedent, the presupposition is preferably accommodated in the main<br />
DRS.<br />
(Actually, I was cheating just now, though not much. If I had blindly<br />
applied the rules of the binding theory as defined in Chapter 2, the reference<br />
marker x in Wilbur's belief DRS would have become unbound. This problem<br />
is liable to raise its head whenever a presupposition is projected to a DRS<br />
that is not strictly acessible to its home DRS. But I didn't apply the rules<br />
blindly, <strong>and</strong> inserted a copy of x into the embedded DRS, <strong>and</strong> will continue<br />
to do so whenever the need arises. The binding theory is easily revised so as<br />
to sanction this sleight of h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>for</strong> instance by adjusting the binding<br />
mechanism or the representation of presuppositions.)<br />
Of course, if a presupposition can be accommodated outside of the belief<br />
context in which it is triggered, it may also be bound there. The following is<br />
a case in point:<br />
(54) If Barney was tripped, then he believes that it was Fred who tripped<br />
him.<br />
Intuitively, the presupposition triggered by the it-cleft in the belief report<br />
about Barney (that Barney was tripped) is bound in the antecedent of the<br />
conditional, <strong>and</strong> this is precisely what our theory predicts:<br />
(55) a. [: [x: x tripped B] =:::} =><br />
[Il, [p_, q: B believes p, p. B believes q,<br />
q = p+[z: z tripped B, B. Z z = F]]]<br />
b. [p: B believes p,<br />
[x, z: Z z = x, x tripped B, Z z tripped B] => =:::}<br />
[q: B believes q, q = p+[z: z = F]]]<br />
c. [p: B believes p,<br />
[x: x tripped B] =::} => [q: B believes q, q = p+[x: x = F]]]