Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
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76 <strong>Presuppositions</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Pronouns</strong><br />
this question will turn out to be, it should be pointed out that the type of<br />
anaphora exemplified by (72b) is not a matter of logic alone. To see this,<br />
consider (74a), which is the disjunctive counterpart to (71a):<br />
(74) a. Either Fred <strong>for</strong>got to bring an umbrella, or it is in the hallway. hallway,<br />
b. Fred didn't <strong>for</strong>get to bring an umbrella.<br />
If the disjunction in (74a) is construed exclusively, the negation of the first<br />
disjunct may be assumed in the second, <strong>and</strong> once (74b) is given it is plausible<br />
to infer that Fred brought an umbrella, which is what enables the anaphoric<br />
pronoun to be interpreted. But (74b) does not entail that Fred brought an<br />
umbrella. So, (74a) is not relevantly different from (71a).<br />
If examples like (72b) <strong>and</strong> (74a) are to be treated along these lines, then<br />
there is no reason to withhold this treatment from (72a). Indeed, since there<br />
is every reason to expect that these sentences are interpreted the same way,<br />
I am <strong>for</strong>ced to concede that (72a) is an instance of bridging, too.<br />
Nevertheless, I am reluctant to give up the accommodation account<br />
altogether, <strong>for</strong> two reasons. First, there are other examples of presupposition<br />
projection in disjunctions <strong>for</strong> which this is the only account that will work.<br />
The following type of case was first discussed by Liberman (1973):<br />
(75) Fred is either dating Barney's wife or his widow.<br />
It will be clear that an explanation in terms of bridging is inappropriate here,<br />
<strong>and</strong> that an account in terms of accommodation is called <strong>for</strong>. A second,<br />
perhaps less compelling, consideration is that in cases like (72a) the<br />
accommodation <strong>and</strong> bridging accounts are not at odds with each other; they<br />
give the same results. It is possible, there<strong>for</strong>e, that a hearer may use either<br />
method to arrive at the intended reading. In the pronominal case, this is not<br />
so, because pronouns are generally difficult to interpret by way of<br />
accommodation, <strong>and</strong> besides accommodation will produce a different<br />
reading, as we have seen.<br />
It may be rare <strong>for</strong> a pronoun to be bound to an antecedent that was not<br />
explicitly introduced in the previous discourse, <strong>and</strong> must there<strong>for</strong>e be<br />
inferred. However, with other types of presupposition triggers bridging is<br />
much more common.<br />
(76) a. If Wilma is married, then her husb<strong>and</strong> is a lucky fellow. fellow,<br />
b. If Fred doesn't want to come, Barney won't come either.<br />
The definite NP her husb<strong>and</strong> in (76a) does not have an antecedent<br />
expression, but of course if Wilma is married she will have a husb<strong>and</strong>, so a<br />
suitable antecedent is easily inferred. Similarly, in (76b) the particle either<br />
triggers the presupposition that someone other than Barney will not come,