Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
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Presupposition 9<br />
there is a way of negating (22a) that does not preserve the inference that the<br />
speaker takes (22b) to be true:<br />
(23) Who didn't kill Caesar<br />
But this does not prove that (22a) doesn't presuppose (22b). If (22a) triggers<br />
the presupposition that (22b) is true, it is presumably the entire question that<br />
acts as a presupposition inducer. So when applying the negation test, we have<br />
to determine, not what happens when we insert a negation somewhere into<br />
this alleged presupposition inducer but rather what happens when a negation<br />
sign takes scope over the question as a whole. But of course, questions are<br />
allergic to external negation:<br />
(24) It is not the case that who killed Caesar<br />
If we want to prove that (22a) presupposes (22b), then it must be shown that<br />
this inference exhibits projection behaviour, <strong>and</strong> that turns out to be difficult,<br />
because as a rule questions cannot occur in embedded positions. There may<br />
be one or two exceptions though.<br />
(25) a. Fred asked who killed Caesar.<br />
b. If Brutus wasn't in town, then who killed Caesar<br />
c. If Ceasar was killed, then who killed Caesar<br />
In (25a), an interrogative sentence occurs in an embedded position, <strong>and</strong> if it<br />
were the case that we would normally infer from this sentence that someone<br />
killed Caesar (which isn't too clear), then we would at least have some<br />
evidence that this is a presupposition triggered by the w/z-complement. wh-complement. The<br />
contrast between (25b) <strong>and</strong> (25c) is more significant, because in the <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
case there is a strong tendency to infer that, according to the speaker,<br />
someone killed Caesar, which is absent in the latter case. This is precisely<br />
what we should expect if (22c) triggered the presupposition that (22b) is<br />
true. However, this is the only halfway sound piece of positive evidence that<br />
we have turned up so far, <strong>and</strong> even it is not beyond suspicion, because the<br />
contrast between (25b, c) only counts if the consequent of these conditionals<br />
is equivalent in all relevant respects (whatever they may be) to the sentence<br />
in (22a). This might entail that (25b, c) are conditional questions, <strong>and</strong> there<br />
has been quite some resistance against the notion of conditional speech act,<br />
which is pointedly summarized in Walker's (1975: 145) rhetorical question:<br />
'How can one per<strong>for</strong>m a speech act in a conditional way, any more than one<br />
can st<strong>and</strong> on one's head in a conditional way'<br />
To sum up: there is precious little direct evidence <strong>for</strong> the hypothesis that a<br />
wh-question w/z-question presupposes the corresponding existential declarative, because<br />
it is so difficult <strong>for</strong> questions to occur in embedded positions, if they can<br />
occur in such positions at all. In other words, it is a non-trivial matter to show