Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
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Presupposition 27<br />
readings in terms of scope, we have to make some pretty fancy assumptions,<br />
but I am willing to grant practically anything if only I can get my main point<br />
across. Here, then, is how (58a) might be represented:<br />
(59) [the e: Fred dated Betty during e] O(Fred stopped e)<br />
The intended interpretation of (59) is that there is a unique event e during<br />
which Fred dated Betty, <strong>and</strong> that, possibly, Fred discontinued e. Supposing<br />
that this is right, how did we get from (58a) to (59) One answer to this<br />
question is that we construed the gerund dating Betty as a definite, <strong>and</strong> gave<br />
it wide scope. This cannot be right, however, because this procedure would<br />
give the wrong result <strong>for</strong> (58b):<br />
(60) [the e: Fred dated Betty during e] O(Fred started e)<br />
This says that Fred used to date Betty, whereas it should say the opposite. It<br />
seems, there<strong>for</strong>e, that we have to claim that in both cases part of the<br />
interpretation of the whole predicate is extracted to give it wide scope. So<br />
stopped dating Betty is parsed as 'dated Betty <strong>and</strong> stopped doing so', <strong>and</strong><br />
started dating Betty is parsed as 'did not date Betty but started doing so', <strong>and</strong><br />
in both cases the first half of the analysis is construed as a definite expression,<br />
which is given wide scope. I don't think it will be necessary to spell out why<br />
this line of analysis is not very promising.<br />
Thus far it would seem that a scope analysis of projection phenomena is<br />
not impossible to carry through, although it will require a number of unlikely<br />
assumptions. But there are also data that are definitely outside the purview<br />
of a scope analysis.<br />
(61) a. Most professors sold their Coca Cola shares.<br />
b. Theo usually stops drinking be<strong>for</strong>e he gets sick.<br />
c. Everyone should leave his camera at the in<strong>for</strong>mation desk.<br />
What these sentences have in common is that, on their most natural readings,<br />
a presuppositional expression in the predicate somehow restricts the domain<br />
of a quantifier. Thus, (61a) will be read as saying that most of the professors<br />
who owned Coca Cola shares sold them; (61b) says that usually, if Theo<br />
drinks, he stops be<strong>for</strong>e he gets sick; <strong>and</strong> the most likely interpretation of<br />
(61c) is that everyone who has a camera should leave it at the in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
desk. Apparently, the sources of these restrictions are the presuppositions<br />
triggered by their Coca Cola shares, stops drinking, <strong>and</strong> his camera,<br />
respectively. These readings cannot be accounted <strong>for</strong> in terms of scope. In<br />
(61a), <strong>for</strong> instance, there are two scope-bearing expressions (if Russell is<br />
right), one of which contains a pronoun which is bound by the first, so the<br />
only reading a Russellian theory will deliver <strong>for</strong> this sentence is something<br />
like the following: