Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

CHAPTER 4
Dynamic semantics
The differences between the binding theory and the satisfaction theory are
anything but superficial. We have seen that their views on presupposition
diverge considerably, and that, consequently, the two theories yield different
predictions. But their differences go even deeper than this; they represent
entirely different approaches to meaning. Whereas the binding theory is a
version of DRT, the satisfaction theory requires a dynamic semantics; and
the differences between these approaches are profound. This is not the
standard view. DRT is commonly treated as one among many varieties of
dynamic semantics. I maintain that this is misleading, however, and restrict
my usage of the term 'dynamic semantics' accordingly.
In this chapter I want to compare DRT and dynamic semantics, and refute
the latter. To this end I will concentrate on anaphoric phenomena;
presuppositions will not play an important role in this chapter. There are two
main reasons for this. First, it is possible to bring out the differences between
DRT and dynamic semantics even if we confine our attention to the simplest
cases of anaphora. Secondly, although I have argued that the standard
dynamic account of presupposition is fatally flawed, I don't want to build my
case against dynamic semantics on this argument, because it is not necessary
for a dynamic semanticist to adopt the satisfaction theory. It is a natural thing
to do, and it would be extremely unnatural to dissociate dynamic semantics
from the satisfaction theory -— but it is not necessary. However, if one adopts
the satisfaction theory, then dynamic semantics is part of the bargain, so any
arguments against the latter undermine the former, too.
In the following I first outline the central tenets of dynamic semantics,
and present my main objection against the theory (§ 4.1). This objection is
perfectly straightforward and, as far as I can see, incontrovertible. Dynamic
semantics is an attempt to explain certain pragmatic phenomena in terms of
the meanings of the connectives, and this whole approach is plainly wrong.
This will be illustrated by means of the dynamic account of conjunction. In
the next section I compare dynamic semantics with DRT, and show where
the principal differences between these frameworks lie (§ 4.2). In the
remainder of the chapter I consider how dynamic semantics might try to
explain forward reference (§ 4.3) and certain interactions between
anaphora on the one hand, and negation and disjunction on the other (§
PRESUPPOSITIONS AND PRONOUNS, Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, Vol. 3
B. Geurts - © 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved