Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
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198 <strong>Presuppositions</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Pronouns</strong><br />
There has been some discussion in the philosophical literature whether the<br />
principle of conditional excluded middle is valid or not:<br />
(51) (ifp, then q) or (ifp, (if/, then not-q)<br />
Stalnaker (1981) argues that this principle is a valid one; Lewis's (1973)<br />
analysis of conditionals implies that it isn't. Consider the following pair of<br />
examples, devised by Quine (1950:14): 14):<br />
(52) a. If Bizet <strong>and</strong> Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have<br />
been Italian.<br />
b. If Bizet <strong>and</strong> Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have<br />
been French.<br />
While on Stalnaker's analysis both conditionals would lack a truth value, on<br />
Lewis's account they would both be false. Although I have a slight preference<br />
<strong>for</strong> Stalnaker's position, I have no particularly strong opinion one way or the<br />
other, <strong>and</strong> mainly want to note here that the analysis of conditionals I<br />
propose throws a new light on this issue. If if-clauses //"-clauses are presupposed, then<br />
the question whether (51) is valid is tied up with the problem of<br />
presupposition failure. It may be argued that the presupposition triggered by<br />
an if-clause //"-clause may fail, <strong>for</strong> instance because the proposition it presents as given<br />
is insufficiently specific. If this is the case, we are in the empirical quicks<strong>and</strong><br />
briefly surveyed in § 1.6. This is doesn't improve the situation, to be sure, but<br />
at least it gives us a better idea where we are.<br />
It is an almost stale observation that there is a close connection between ifclauses<br />
<strong>and</strong> sentences beginning with 'Suppose that...', .', 'Assume that...',<br />
.',<br />
if-<br />
'Given that. ....', .', <strong>and</strong> so on. This connection is noted by Kamp (1988), too,<br />
but he concedes that his version of DRT does not explain it (cf. also Kamp<br />
<strong>and</strong> Reyle 1993: 141-146). On the presuppositional analysis of conditionals,<br />
by contrast, an explanation readily suggests itself.<br />
(53) a. Suppose Fred is a Freemason. Then Barney is a Freemason,<br />
too.<br />
b. If Fred is a Freemason, (then) Barney is a Freemason, too.<br />
Stylistic nuances aside, (43a) <strong>and</strong> (43b) are equivalent. In the first half of<br />
(43a), the speaker invites his audience to suppose the world to be such that<br />
Fred is a Freemason, <strong>and</strong> in the second half he says that in such a world<br />
Barney is a Freemason, too. Interestingly, (43b) can be paraphrased in<br />
exactly the same way.lO 10 To explain this convergence, we only need to assume<br />
10 10 Note, incidentally, that (49) is is matched by:<br />
Suppose we get a taxi, <strong>and</strong> suppose we aren't held up in a traffic jam, <strong>and</strong> suppose<br />
there isn't an air strike; then we'll be in Timbuktu be<strong>for</strong>e teatime.<br />
See Kamp (1988) <strong>for</strong> further discussion of this sort of example.