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Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

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Presupposition 19<br />

pizzeria in the Vatican in (36c) does not merely convey that there is pizzeria<br />

in the Vatican; it is an instruction to the hearer to retrieve (his representation<br />

of) the said restaurant. Anaphoric pronouns, on this view, are just<br />

semantically attenuate presuppositional expressions, <strong>and</strong> the theory of<br />

anaphora is just one of the departments of the theory of presupposition. In a<br />

nutshell, this is the binding theory of presupposition.<br />

1.3 <strong>Presuppositions</strong> vs. implicatures<br />

When taken at face value, presuppositions appear to be defeasible<br />

inferences. By definition, presuppositions are normally impervious to any<br />

<strong>for</strong>m of embedding, <strong>and</strong> will be suppressed under special circumstances<br />

only. We have seen that this impression is actually misleading, because in<br />

reality presuppositions are never cancelled; they may be intercepted in an<br />

intermediate context, but they never disappear altogether. However, let us<br />

ignore this <strong>for</strong> a while, <strong>and</strong> suppose that presuppositions are cancellable, as<br />

they seem to be. If this is so, it is something presuppositions have in<br />

common with conversational implicatures, <strong>and</strong> it is not to be wondered that<br />

many people have considered the possibility of explaining presuppositions<br />

along Gricean lines. One of the first authors to explore this possibility was<br />

Grice himself, although, characteristically, Grice does not align himself with<br />

the position (as he puts it) that presuppositions are implicatures (Grice<br />

1981). He entertains the hypothesis that some alleged instances of<br />

presupposition might be partly explained in terms of implicature, but also<br />

considers the possibility that presupposition might be partly explained in<br />

terms of scope. In short, Grice doesn't risk taking a stance. Where Grice<br />

feared to tread, others have been more daring. For instance, Atlas <strong>and</strong><br />

Levinson (1981) argue that the alleged presuppositions of it-clefts are in fact<br />

conversational implicatures, <strong>and</strong> it has often been suggested that<br />

definiteness <strong>and</strong>/or anaphora might somehow be analysed in terms of<br />

implicature (see Levinson 1987, 1997, <strong>and</strong> Gundel et al. 1993).<br />

In keeping with this trend, it has been claimed that there is such a thing as<br />

a projection problem <strong>for</strong> conversational implicatures. This view is at the<br />

heart of Gazdar's (1979) theory of 'implicature projection', <strong>and</strong> it is<br />

enunciated quite explicitly by Atlas <strong>and</strong> Levinson, too:<br />

The 'filtering' of implicata seems to occur in compound sentences<br />

in the same way that filtering of presupposition occurs. (Atlas <strong>and</strong><br />

Levinson 1981: 5)<br />

More recently, this claim was reiterated by Levinson (1997). To be sure, it is<br />

not necessary <strong>for</strong> a would-be Gricean reductionist to accept this position, but

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