Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
18 <strong>Presuppositions</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Pronouns</strong><br />
b. There were delegates from all provinces, <strong>and</strong> the Queen<br />
talked with all {of them/delegates}.<br />
c. There is a pizzeria in the Vatican, <strong>and</strong> {it/the pizzeria in the<br />
Vatican} is closed.<br />
In each of these examples, a pronoun <strong>and</strong> a presuppositional expression<br />
per<strong>for</strong>m the same duty: if the neuter pronoun in (36a) picks up an antecedent<br />
introduced in the first conjunct, it is natural to suppose that the that-clause<br />
does exactly the same thing. Analogous remarks apply to (36b) <strong>and</strong> (36c).<br />
These observations bring out an aspect of presupposition that we haven't<br />
touched upon so far, because it doesn't figure explicitly in Stalnaker's<br />
writings. 10 We have said that if a speaker presupposes that %, X, he takes it <strong>for</strong><br />
granted that X. %. This is not quite correct, however, or at any rate it is<br />
incomplete. A presupposition is not just something that is taken to be true in<br />
the given context; it is something that is retrieved from the context. The<br />
distinction is subtle but consequential. It is perhaps easiest observed in<br />
definite NPs. We have said, as is common in the presupposition literature,<br />
that a definite NP of the <strong>for</strong>m 'the N' triggers the presupposition that there<br />
is an N. (36c) shows that this is not all, <strong>and</strong> that it is better to say that the<br />
function of such an NP is to retrieve an N from the current context. Similarly,<br />
it is true that the quantified NP all delegates in (36b) requires that there be<br />
delegates, but this is not enough to do justice to the presuppositional<br />
requirements of this NP. Rather, what we should say is that the<br />
presuppositional function of this NP is to retrieve from the context some set<br />
of delegates. Another case in which the distinction is especially vivid are the<br />
presuppositions triggered by focus particles such as too:<br />
(37) I am hungry, too.<br />
With focus on the subject term, the particle too triggers the presupposition<br />
that there are persons other than the speaker who are hungry. But this much<br />
can be taken <strong>for</strong> granted in just about any context, <strong>and</strong> it is clear that (37) can<br />
only be used in contexts in which it is clear whom the speaker has in mind,<br />
<strong>for</strong> example when someone else has previously uttered the same sentence<br />
without the too.<br />
The pronoun it in (36c) does not merely convey that this statement is about<br />
a non-human individual; it is an instruction to the hearer to retrieve (his<br />
representation of) the individual in question. Likewise, the definite NP the<br />
10 10 Which is not to say that it is inconsistent with Stalnaker's views. If I were bent on proving that<br />
Stalnaker's work prefigures every major aspect of the theory that I am going to defend, I would<br />
certainly point to some of his remarks about pronouns, which show that he views anaphors as<br />
presupposition-inducing expressions in some sense (cf. Stalnaker 1973: 449, 454). But the sober<br />
truth is that nothing in Stalnaker's writings indicates a clear awareness of the intimate<br />
relationship between presupposition <strong>and</strong> anaphora.