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Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

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18 <strong>Presuppositions</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Pronouns</strong><br />

b. There were delegates from all provinces, <strong>and</strong> the Queen<br />

talked with all {of them/delegates}.<br />

c. There is a pizzeria in the Vatican, <strong>and</strong> {it/the pizzeria in the<br />

Vatican} is closed.<br />

In each of these examples, a pronoun <strong>and</strong> a presuppositional expression<br />

per<strong>for</strong>m the same duty: if the neuter pronoun in (36a) picks up an antecedent<br />

introduced in the first conjunct, it is natural to suppose that the that-clause<br />

does exactly the same thing. Analogous remarks apply to (36b) <strong>and</strong> (36c).<br />

These observations bring out an aspect of presupposition that we haven't<br />

touched upon so far, because it doesn't figure explicitly in Stalnaker's<br />

writings. 10 We have said that if a speaker presupposes that %, X, he takes it <strong>for</strong><br />

granted that X. %. This is not quite correct, however, or at any rate it is<br />

incomplete. A presupposition is not just something that is taken to be true in<br />

the given context; it is something that is retrieved from the context. The<br />

distinction is subtle but consequential. It is perhaps easiest observed in<br />

definite NPs. We have said, as is common in the presupposition literature,<br />

that a definite NP of the <strong>for</strong>m 'the N' triggers the presupposition that there<br />

is an N. (36c) shows that this is not all, <strong>and</strong> that it is better to say that the<br />

function of such an NP is to retrieve an N from the current context. Similarly,<br />

it is true that the quantified NP all delegates in (36b) requires that there be<br />

delegates, but this is not enough to do justice to the presuppositional<br />

requirements of this NP. Rather, what we should say is that the<br />

presuppositional function of this NP is to retrieve from the context some set<br />

of delegates. Another case in which the distinction is especially vivid are the<br />

presuppositions triggered by focus particles such as too:<br />

(37) I am hungry, too.<br />

With focus on the subject term, the particle too triggers the presupposition<br />

that there are persons other than the speaker who are hungry. But this much<br />

can be taken <strong>for</strong> granted in just about any context, <strong>and</strong> it is clear that (37) can<br />

only be used in contexts in which it is clear whom the speaker has in mind,<br />

<strong>for</strong> example when someone else has previously uttered the same sentence<br />

without the too.<br />

The pronoun it in (36c) does not merely convey that this statement is about<br />

a non-human individual; it is an instruction to the hearer to retrieve (his<br />

representation of) the individual in question. Likewise, the definite NP the<br />

10 10 Which is not to say that it is inconsistent with Stalnaker's views. If I were bent on proving that<br />

Stalnaker's work prefigures every major aspect of the theory that I am going to defend, I would<br />

certainly point to some of his remarks about pronouns, which show that he views anaphors as<br />

presupposition-inducing expressions in some sense (cf. Stalnaker 1973: 449, 454). But the sober<br />

truth is that nothing in Stalnaker's writings indicates a clear awareness of the intimate<br />

relationship between presupposition <strong>and</strong> anaphora.

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