01.02.2015 Views

Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Attitude reports 157<br />

(46b) involves two belief contexts, represented by (46b 2 ) <strong>and</strong> (46b 3 ) one of<br />

which is embedded in the other. These two DRSs share a reference marker,<br />

i.e. z, <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e the values of z have to be counterparts. That is, the<br />

correlate of z in somebody^ x's belief context must be a counterpart to the<br />

correlate of z in someone/s 's belief context. Furthermore, since (46b l 1 ) <strong>and</strong><br />

(46b 2 ) share a reference marker, too, i.e. y, the correlate of y in somebody^'s x's<br />

belief context will have to be a counterpart to the correlate of y in the<br />

speaker's commitment slate, which is represented by (46b).<br />

If this is a treatment of de re readings, my notion of de re construal is a<br />

rather weak one. In the case of (46a), <strong>for</strong> example, the analysis I propose<br />

merely says that there is some correlation between what the speaker is<br />

committed to <strong>and</strong> what somebody^, somebodyx is claimed to believe. Many<br />

philosophers would not want to call this a de re construal, because they<br />

hold, <strong>for</strong> example, that one can only have de re beliefs about objects that<br />

one has had intimate cognitive intercourse with. However, save <strong>for</strong><br />

terminological differences, my account is compatible with virtually any<br />

theory of de re attitudes that I know of. For my current purposes, the<br />

philosophical controversies over de re attitudes <strong>and</strong> attitude reports are<br />

largely irrelevant, because my main concern is that there is sometimes a<br />

correlation between the speaker's commitments <strong>and</strong> the beliefs he ascribes<br />

to someone else; I am less interested in what exactly the nature of such<br />

correlations may be, <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e I will not take a very specific stance on<br />

de re attitudes <strong>and</strong> attitude reports.<br />

If we want to give a more precise characterization of the proposed<br />

treatment of counterparts, it is helpful to first define a relation which is less<br />

restrictive than the strict accessibility relation given in (37). This relation,<br />

which I dub 'weak accessibility', holds whenever strict accessibility holds, but<br />

in addition it holds across attitude contexts as well:<br />

(47) Employment<br />

Let T(a) T(oc) = {a}, if a E e RMi RM- u RM p ,' <strong>and</strong> T(P+

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!