Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
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Presupposition 31<br />
describes a transition from one state to another: from growing tulips tUlips to not<br />
growing tulips (63a), from not growing tulips to growing tulips (63b), <strong>and</strong><br />
from growing tulips to growing even more tulips tUlips (63c). In each case it is the<br />
initial state whose existence is presupposed, not the ensuing one, <strong>and</strong> this<br />
observation turns out to apply to all transition verbs (apart from those in<br />
(63) there are: discontinue, go on, persist in, <strong>and</strong> so on) as well as to particles<br />
like still, already, anymore, <strong>and</strong> so on. Of course, this regularity could be<br />
captured by devising a rule that states that all these items have this property,<br />
instead of stipulating it <strong>for</strong> each separately,19 but one suspects that this rule<br />
should somehow follow from some semantic <strong>and</strong>/or pragmatic property that<br />
these expressions have in common.<br />
It should be noted that, intuitively speaking, it is eminently reasonable that<br />
aspectual verbs should have the presuppositions that they in fact have. It<br />
seems unlikely that we should ever come across a verb that meant exactly the<br />
same thing as begin with the only difference that it presupposes what begin<br />
asserts <strong>and</strong> vice versa. And I believe that it is intuitively clear why this should<br />
be so. It is because interlocutors are more interested in where the story is<br />
leading to than where it came from, <strong>and</strong> there<strong>for</strong>e tend to take the past as<br />
given. If a change is described, the initial state is in a sense backgrounded<br />
because we are more interested in the present <strong>and</strong> the future. And this<br />
backgrounding corresponds with presupposition.<br />
Be<strong>for</strong>e I try to draw a moral from this observation, let me introduce a<br />
second example. Factive predicates presuppose their complements.<br />
Compare:<br />
(64)<br />
nice }<br />
. tragic .. .<br />
It IS disgusting that Fred IS readmg Kropotkm.<br />
{<br />
odd<br />
(65)<br />
likely }<br />
. ossible .. .<br />
It IS Pb· that Fred IS readmg Kropotkm.<br />
{ o VIOUS<br />
true<br />
The st<strong>and</strong>ard tests show that the factive predicates in (64) trigger the<br />
presupposition that Fred is reading Kropotkin, whereas the predicates in<br />
(65) don't. Why is that To begin with, note that, whereas all variants in (64)<br />
entail that Fred is reading Kropotkin, not all variants of (65) do. If it is<br />
obvious or true that Fred is reading Kropotkin, then Fred must be reading