Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

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Preface In his thumbnail sketch of the history of dynamic semantics, Kamp reports as follows: [The study of certain linguistic phenomena] has led to what might be termed a 'dynamic' theory of the semantics of natural language, which was first developed, in at least two different forms, in the early eighties. One of these has come to be known as Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). [...] The semantic approach which DRT exemplifies has been developed also in other ways, most notably in the form of Heim's File Change Semantics, which was conceived at roughly the same time as DRT. [...] ] Since the early eighties a number of further variants of the approach have appeared, most notably the relational approach of Barwise and the development of Dynamic Predicate Logic of Groenendijk en [sic] Stokhof. (Kamp 1990: 33-34) This is the standard account. It has it that dynamic semantics is an approach to meaning that was developed in the early eighties by Kamp and Heim, and was subsequently carried on by others, including Barwise and Groenendijk and Stokhof. Although historically speaking there may be some truth to this view, I believe it must be rejected for ideological reasons. In my opinion, Heim's work inaugurated a paradigm which is quite different from the DRT approach. So different, in fact, that I propose to reserve the label 'dynamic semantics' for the approach taken by Heim, Barwise, and the Amsterdam school led by Groenendijk and Stokhof. This approach is truly dynamic in a sense in which DRT is not. DRT is a theory of interpretation in two senses of the word. It is a theory of meaning and it is also a theory of language understanding. DRT is a cognitivist theory, which is based on the insight that a semantic theory must of cogni- necessity take into account the mental processes involved in handling language. It is somewhat harder to explain in one paragraph what dynamic semantics is, partly because it isn't quite clear what it is. What is clear is that its starting point is the pedestrian observation that utterances cause changes. An
xii Presuppositions and Pronouns utterance changes the situation in which it occurs, for example, and it causes changes in the interlocutors' cognitive states. It is this observation, I take it, which inspired the notion that the meaning of an expression must be defined in terms of the changes it would cause in a given context. In Heim's words: the meaning of an expression is its context change potential. At a technical level, DRT and dynamic semantics can be spelled out in such a way that they come to look quite similar, which is presumably what has fostered the myth that they are similar, and that any differences between the two theories are to be treated as domestic affairs. I maintain that this impres- impression is quite misleading: the differences between D DRT and dynamic semantics are so great that they can hardly be overstated. One of the ways in which DRT and dynamic semantics diverge is that they give rise to different theories of presupposition projection, which I will call the 'binding theory' and the 'satisfaction theory', respectively. The binding theory, which was first outlined by van der Sandt (1987), is a version of DRT whose main tenet is that presuppositions are entities that want to be bound in the same sense in which anaphors want to be bound. When one thinks in DRT terms, this is a view that comes naturally: although it is theoretically possible to implement just about any account of presupposition in a DRT framework, the binding theory is the most obvious choice. The same can be said of the relation between dynamic semantics and the satisfaction theory of presupposition projection, which goes back to Heim (1983). The satisfaction theory requires that we adopt some version of dynamic semantics, and if one must deal with presupposition projection in a dynamic framework, it is almost frivolous to forgo the satisfaction theory. The relation between the binding theory and the satisfaction theory resembles that between the semantic theories of which they are offshoots. Prima facie, they are so similar that it has been suggested that they are equiv- equivalent, but on closer inspection it appears that they are incompatible. Hence, these two theories and their frameworks arrange themselves in a square of opposition: binding satisfaction H theory theory J, I IJ, dynamic DRT H „ f semantics lC Gloss: 'x H
Page 2 and 3: Presuppositions and Pronouns
Page 4 and 5: PRESUPPOSITIONS AND PRONOUNS Bart G
Page 6 and 7: Current Research in the Semantics/P
Page 8 and 9: To Julia
Page 10 and 11: Contents PREFACE xi 1 PRESUPPOSITIO
Page 14 and 15: xiii presuppositions already involv
Page 16 and 17: CHAPTER 1 Presupposition The phenom
Page 18 and 19: Presupposition 3 c. If Barney has s
Page 20 and 21: Presupposition 5 apply to their int
Page 22 and 23: Presupposition 17 sentences in (15)
Page 24 and 25: Presupposition 9 there is a way of
Page 26 and 27: Presupposition 11 judgment of the f
Page 28 and 29: Presupposition 13 that requires a m
Page 30 and 31: Presupposition 15 b. If Barney took
Page 32 and 33: Presupposition 17 conditionals have
Page 34 and 35: Presupposition 19 pizzeria in the V
Page 36 and 37: Presupposition 21 recipient of this
Page 38 and 39: Presupposition 23 (45) Fred's wife
Page 40 and 41: Presupposition 25 (51) [the x: King
Page 42 and 43: Presupposition 27 readings in terms
Page 44 and 45: Presupposition 29 actually has a nu
Page 46 and 47: Presupposition 31 describes a trans
Page 48 and 49: Presupposition 33 of this complexit
Page 50 and 51: CHAPTER 2 The binding theory Althou
Page 52 and 53: The binding theory 37 b. [y,.w: [v,
Page 54 and 55: The binding theory 39 correlated wi
Page 56 and 57: The binding theory 41 (10) a. Eithe
Page 58 and 59: The binding theory 43 The content o
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The binding theory 47 apply. Soames
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The binding theory 49 Disjunction '
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The binding theory 51 me from sayin
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The binding theory 53 (35) a. [u, v
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The binding theory 55 line, presupp
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The binding theory 57 We are now al
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The binding theory 59 interpretatio
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The binding theory 61 accommodation
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The binding theory 63 sentence (i.e
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The binding theory 65 In the preced
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The binding theory 67 presuppositio
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The binding theory 69 Our procedure
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The binding theory 71 c. (Esker too
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The binding theory 73 (67) The doct
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The binding theory 75 an umbrella,
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The binding theory 77 and although
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The binding theory 79 any given pre
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The binding theory 81 marker x in t
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The binding theory 83 In the versio
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The binding theory 85 (88) a. Did y
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CHAPTER 3 The satisfaction theory C
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The satisfaction theory 89 Accordin
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The satisfaction theory 91 b. c[(p
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The satisfaction theory 93 (7) Eith
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The satisfaction theory 95 conditio
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The satisfaction theory 97 § 3.4 a
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The satisfaction theory 99 merely p
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The satisfaction theory 101 All I h
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The satisfaction theory 103 I belie
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The satisfaction theory 105 Karttun
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The satisfaction theory 107 implies
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The satisfaction theory 109 enterta
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The satisfaction theory 111 manner.
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The satisfaction theory 113 trigger
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CHAPTER 4 Dynamic semantics The dif
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Dynamic semantics 117 the existenti
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Dynamic semantics 119 taken serious
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Dynamic semantics 121 phenomena suc
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Dynamic semantics 123 implementatio
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Dynamic semantics 125 number of pos
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Dynamic semantics 127 having to ass
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Dynamic semantics 129 Here anaphora
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Dynamic semantics 131 (19) a. Eithe
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CHAPTERS 5 Attitude reports Althoug
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Attitude reports 135 believe, but n
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Attitude reports 137 Presupposition
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Attitude reports 139 (11) Hob think
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Attitude reports 141 have chosen to
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Attitude reports 143 For the verb w
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Attitude reports 145 he has a son,
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Attitude reports 147 all obvious th
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Attitude reports 149 common sense n
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Attitude reports 151 (34) a. There
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Attitude reports 153 (39) a. [x, y,
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Attitude reports 155 c. c - [
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Attitude reports 157 (46b) involves
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Attitude reports 159 5.5 Presupposi
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Attitude reports 161 I have said th
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Attitude reports 163 The first pres
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Attitude reports 165 This argument
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Attitude reports 167 It may sometim
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Attitude reports 169 there is a boy
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Attitude reports 171 and asserts of
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Attitude reports 173 (74) c. [p,p',
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CHAPTER 6 Modals As it stands, the
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Modals 177 111 can be dealt with by
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Modals 179 means that the material
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Modals 181 (13) a. Either it is in
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Modals 183 It is difficult to link
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Modals 185 Assuming just that modal
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Modals 187 g(q') S(q') = {(v,j) { E
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Modals 189 b. Nobody turned up at B
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Modals 191 q. Thus our theory impli
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Modals 193 The discourse in (39) is
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Modals 195 On the Kratzer/Lewis ana
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Modals 197 bound and is therefore a
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Modals 199 that the first sentence
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CHAPTER 7 Names What could be simpl
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Names 203 had scope but will also t
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Names 205 why use this word when a
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Names 207 Although it is always har
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Names 209 apparent difficulties, ca
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Names 211 have names; some of these
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Names 213 is (14c). Hence, on the p
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Names 215 that he himself might hav
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Names 217 alternative theories of m
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Names 219 Since John treats anaphor
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Names 221 NPs, and in doing so he b
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References Asher, N. 1986: Belief i
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References 225 Grice, H.P. 1975: Lo
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References 227 Levinson, S.c. S.C.
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References 229 Zeevat, H. 1989a: A
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Subject index accessibility: 38-39,
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Index of names Asher, N. xiii, 37,1
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