Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
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The binding theory 53<br />
(35) a. [u, v, w: w = u, Fred u, rabbit v, u owns v, male w,<br />
[: pink v] ~ => [: happy w]]<br />
b. [u, v: Fred u, rabbit v, u owns v, male u,<br />
[: pink v] ~ => [: happy u]]<br />
This DRS does entail that Fred has a rabbit, <strong>and</strong> thus the theory accounts <strong>for</strong><br />
the observation that a speaker who volunteers (28b) commits himself to the<br />
assumption that Fred has a rabbit.<br />
If we imposed no further restrictions on the notion of accommodation we<br />
would predict that, whenever a presupposition cannot be bound to a suitable<br />
antecedent, it will be accommodated in the least embedded position, which<br />
will always be in the principal DRS. (28c) serves to illustrate that this would<br />
not always be correct. Let us start out from the following DRS <strong>for</strong> (28c), in<br />
which the presupposition induced by the proper name has already been dealt<br />
with:<br />
(36) [x: Fred x,<br />
[: o[y: -{y: rabbit y, x owns y]] v [z: rabbit z. z, x owns z. z, in-hiding z]]<br />
Again, there is no suitable antecedent accessible to the presupposition,<br />
which there<strong>for</strong>e will have to be accommodated. But this time, if we should<br />
allow <strong>for</strong> accommodation in the principal DRS, we would get the wrong<br />
result:<br />
(37) [x, z: Fred x, rabbit z, x owns z,<br />
[: o[y: -i[y: rabbit y, x owns y]] v [: in-hiding z]]<br />
(37) entails that Fred owns a rabbit, which means that (28c) would<br />
presuppose (28d), <strong>and</strong> that, we observed, is not the case.<br />
Van der S<strong>and</strong>t proposes to deal with this problem by assuming that<br />
accommodation is subject to certain general constraints on interpretation.<br />
He defines a notion of acceptability which rules out a DRS like (37) as being<br />
pragmatically unacceptable, <strong>and</strong> stipulates that accommodation may not<br />
result in an unacceptable DRS. In the case of (36) this <strong>for</strong>ces the<br />
presupposition to be accommodated in its home DRS rather than in the<br />
principal DRS, <strong>and</strong> thus it is explained why (28c) doesn't presuppose that<br />
(28d) is true.<br />
In the following I will present an account of presupposition projection<br />
which takes as its point of departure van der S<strong>and</strong>t's thesis that<br />
presupposition is to be analysed in terms of binding. I will accordingly call it<br />
the 'binding theory' of presupposition. I am aware that syntacticians have<br />
been using this term in a rather different sense, but their usage is so different<br />
from mine that my appropriation of the term is unlikely to engender<br />
confusion. There are three points at which my theory diverges from van der