Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics
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164 <strong>Presuppositions</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Pronouns</strong><br />
as well as an external component (§ 5.1). This observation can now be<br />
expressed as follows: if a presupposition is neither bound nor accommodated<br />
within the belief context in which it is triggered (hence is projected to an<br />
external position), it will often be construed internally, to boot. This extra<br />
internal construal is not of a presuppositional nature, though it is based upon<br />
a presupposition, construed externally. It will be convenient to have a name<br />
<strong>for</strong> this additional inference: I will call it 'importation', the idea being that a<br />
piece of in<strong>for</strong>mation is imported into a belief context. In the following I will<br />
elaborate upon this proposal, <strong>and</strong> contrast it with the opposite view<br />
advocated by Karttunen <strong>and</strong> Heim.<br />
Consider the following example, which I borrow from Heim (1992: 206):<br />
(57) a. John believes that it stopped raining.<br />
b. John believes that it was raining.<br />
c. It was raining.<br />
Some theories of presupposition predict that (57a) presupposes that (57b) is<br />
true; this holds, in particular, <strong>for</strong> the theories proposed by Karttunen (1974)<br />
<strong>and</strong> Heim (1992). For these theories the problem is to explain why, in<br />
addition, (57c) would occasionally be conveyed by an utterance of (57a), as<br />
well, <strong>and</strong> here an exportation argument naturally suggests itself. This is in<br />
fact the course taken by Karttunen <strong>and</strong> by Heim. The latter argues as<br />
follows: 13 13<br />
[...] ] assumptions to be accommodated are supposed to be<br />
uncontroversial <strong>and</strong> unsurprising. [...] ] So when we hear [(57a)] out<br />
of the blue, we know two things: first, as a matter of the semantics<br />
of this sentence, we know that it requires the presupposition that<br />
John believes that it was raining. Second, we know that the speaker<br />
takes this to be uncontroversial <strong>and</strong> unsurprising. Now why would<br />
it be unsurprising that John has such a belief The most natural<br />
guess is that it would be unsurprising because it was in fact raining<br />
<strong>and</strong> John was in an appropriate position to find out. Of course,<br />
these are not the only possible conditions under which someone<br />
might <strong>for</strong>m a belief that it was raining; but they are the most normal<br />
conditions. (Heim 1992: 212)<br />
13 13 Kay (1992) presents an argument which is similar to Heim's. This is one of two strategies<br />
considered by Heim <strong>for</strong> explaining two-sided readings (the other, which is based upon the idea<br />
that external readings might in fact be de re construals, was discussed in § 5.2). The argument<br />
that Heim presents in the passage cited here is reminiscent of Karttunen <strong>and</strong> Peters's proposal<br />
<strong>for</strong> dealing with the proviso problem, which was discussed in Chapter 3.