01.02.2015 Views

Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

Presuppositions and Pronouns - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

164 <strong>Presuppositions</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Pronouns</strong><br />

as well as an external component (§ 5.1). This observation can now be<br />

expressed as follows: if a presupposition is neither bound nor accommodated<br />

within the belief context in which it is triggered (hence is projected to an<br />

external position), it will often be construed internally, to boot. This extra<br />

internal construal is not of a presuppositional nature, though it is based upon<br />

a presupposition, construed externally. It will be convenient to have a name<br />

<strong>for</strong> this additional inference: I will call it 'importation', the idea being that a<br />

piece of in<strong>for</strong>mation is imported into a belief context. In the following I will<br />

elaborate upon this proposal, <strong>and</strong> contrast it with the opposite view<br />

advocated by Karttunen <strong>and</strong> Heim.<br />

Consider the following example, which I borrow from Heim (1992: 206):<br />

(57) a. John believes that it stopped raining.<br />

b. John believes that it was raining.<br />

c. It was raining.<br />

Some theories of presupposition predict that (57a) presupposes that (57b) is<br />

true; this holds, in particular, <strong>for</strong> the theories proposed by Karttunen (1974)<br />

<strong>and</strong> Heim (1992). For these theories the problem is to explain why, in<br />

addition, (57c) would occasionally be conveyed by an utterance of (57a), as<br />

well, <strong>and</strong> here an exportation argument naturally suggests itself. This is in<br />

fact the course taken by Karttunen <strong>and</strong> by Heim. The latter argues as<br />

follows: 13 13<br />

[...] ] assumptions to be accommodated are supposed to be<br />

uncontroversial <strong>and</strong> unsurprising. [...] ] So when we hear [(57a)] out<br />

of the blue, we know two things: first, as a matter of the semantics<br />

of this sentence, we know that it requires the presupposition that<br />

John believes that it was raining. Second, we know that the speaker<br />

takes this to be uncontroversial <strong>and</strong> unsurprising. Now why would<br />

it be unsurprising that John has such a belief The most natural<br />

guess is that it would be unsurprising because it was in fact raining<br />

<strong>and</strong> John was in an appropriate position to find out. Of course,<br />

these are not the only possible conditions under which someone<br />

might <strong>for</strong>m a belief that it was raining; but they are the most normal<br />

conditions. (Heim 1992: 212)<br />

13 13 Kay (1992) presents an argument which is similar to Heim's. This is one of two strategies<br />

considered by Heim <strong>for</strong> explaining two-sided readings (the other, which is based upon the idea<br />

that external readings might in fact be de re construals, was discussed in § 5.2). The argument<br />

that Heim presents in the passage cited here is reminiscent of Karttunen <strong>and</strong> Peters's proposal<br />

<strong>for</strong> dealing with the proviso problem, which was discussed in Chapter 3.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!